Maryland Law Review
Volume 55 | Issue 2

Physician-assisted Death: an Essay on
Constitutional Rights and Remedies
Sylvia A. Law

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Sylvia A. Law, Physician-assisted Death: an Essay on Constitutional Rights and Remedies, 55 Md. L. Rev. 292 (1996)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol55/iss2/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.

Article 4

Articles
PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED DEATH: AN ESSAY ON
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND REMEDIES
SYLVIA

A.

LAW*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CRIMINAL LAWS PROHIBITING

294

PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED DEATH FOR THE TERMINALLY ILL .....

A.
B.

II.

Physician-Assisted Death as a ConstitutionallyProtected
L iberty ..............................................
State Interests in Banning Physician-Assisted Dying ......
1. Coercion .........................................
2. Best Interests, Individual and Social................
3. Sanctity of Life ...................................

THE JUSTICIABILITY OF CHALLENGES

297
307
307
311
314

TO STATE POLICIES

ALLEGED TO VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED
RIGHTS OF SOME, BUT NOT ALL, OF THOSE TO WHOM THEY

APPLY ...................................................
A. Defense to CriminalProsecution........................
B. Affirmative Individual Claims .........................
C. Affirmative Class Claims ..............................

III.

316
316
317
321

DEVISING JUDICIAL REMEDIES FOR LAWS THAT VIOLATE THE
CONSTITUTIONAL

RIGHTS

OF SOME,

BUT

NOT ALL,

OF

324

THOSE TO WHOM THEY APPLY. ............................

A.

*

The Salerno Rule:
The Stealth Destruction
ConstitutionalLiberty .................................

of
325

Elizabeth K. Dollard Professor of Law, Medicine, and Psychiatry, New York Univer-

sity School of Law. B.A., Antioch College; J.D., New York University. This Article is a revised version of the 1995 Stuart Rome Lecture on Law and Ethics, delivered at the
University of Maryland School of Law on April 5. 1995. My son, Benjamin Ensminger-Law,
triggered my interest in physician-assisted death by asking me to talk to his classmates at
Friends Seminary on a legal topic about which reasonable people disagree. Kathryn L.
Tucker of the firm of Perkins Coie, Seattle, Washington, who represents the plaintiffs in
Compassion in Dying, generously provided information and criticism. The NYU Law
Faculty Brown Bag group contributed useful suggestions, which are noted at appropriate
places in the text. Professor Michael Dorf, one of the leading scholars of constitutional
remedy, read an early draft and provided helpful comments on Part III. My research assistant, Amy Sandgrund, NYU Law 1997, tracked down the hard-to-find facts and offered
helpful insights. NYU's Faculty Research Program supported my work.

1996]

PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED DEATH

B. Refuse Relief Unless the Challenged Law Denies the
ConstitutionalRights of Most People It Affects ...........
C. Limit Remedies to Named Parties.......................
D. Strike the UnconstitutionalLaw and Let the Legislature Try
A gain ...............................................
E. Explain Why the Law Is Unconstitutional and Enjoin
UnconstitutionalApplications..........................
CONCLUSION ...................................................

331
334
336
337
341

This Article addresses two important issues of constitutional law.
First, as a matter of substantive constitutional law, do statutes
criminalizing assisted suicide violate the liberty or privacy rights of
terminally ill people who seek physician assistance in hastening death?
Second, if criminal laws against physician-assisted suicide violate the
constitutional rights of some, but not all, of the people they affect,
when and how should courts remedy this violation?
Part I considers the substantive constitutional question of
whether assisted suicide should ever be regarded as an aspect of
constitutionally protected liberty and privacy. It concludes that, while
in many situations state criminal bans on assisted suicide are
defensible, in some circumstances criminal laws that punish those who
help others to hasten death violate liberty and privacy interests of
people who seek help in dying.
Part II considers the ways in which these issues come before the
courts, including as defenses to criminal prosecution, individual
claims, and class actions. It argues that defenses to criminal
prosecution and individual claims for declaratory and injunctive relief
are inadequate to protect the constitutional liberties articulated in
Part I.
Part III addresses the remedial choices that confront ajudge who
is persuaded by the reasoning of Parts I and II: that a law banning
assisted suicide is unconstitutional as applied, and that defenses to
criminal prosecution or individual claims for declaratory and
injunctive relief are inadequate to protect the constitutional liberty
interest.
The challenge of providing effective remedies to protect
constitutional rights is a common problem in constitutional law, not
particular to assisted suicide. Part III demonstrates how remedial
concerns shape the definition of substantive rights and concepts of
justiciability. It explores the available remedial choices and suggests
factors judges should consider in fashioning remedies.
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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CRIMINAL LAWS PROHIBITING

PHYsIcIAN-AssISTED DEATH FOR THE TERMINALLY ILL

In 1994 Dr. Jane Roe of Seattle was dying. She wanted her doctor
to help her die more quickly. Washington state law made it a crime
for her physician to help her.' She, and others, filed suit in federal
court arguing that the criminal penalty against assisted suicide is unconstitutional as applied to physicians helping adults who are mentally competent, terminally ill, and acting under no undue influence
2
to voluntarily hasten their death.
The court described Dr. Roe as follows:
[She] is a 69-year-old retired pediatrician who has suffered
since 1988 from cancer which has now metastasized throughout her skeleton. Although she tried and benefitted temporarily from various treatments including chemotherapy and
radiation, she is now in the terminal phase of her disease....
[She] has been almost completely bedridden since June
of 1993 and experiences constant pain, which becomes especially sharp and severe when she moves. The only medical
treatment available to her . . . cannot fully alleviate her
pain....
[She] is mentally competent and wishes to hasten her
death by taking prescribed drugs with the help of plaintiff
3
Compassion in Dying.
Compassion in Dying, the group that sought to help Dr. Roe, provides support, counseling, and assistance to mentally competent, terminally ill adults considering actions to hasten death.4 The group
provides free services to individuals who meet its strict eligibility
5
requirements.
1. Washington has no law prohibiting suicide or attempted suicide. However, Washington bans aiding or causing the suicide of another: "A person is guilty of promoting a
suicide attempt when he knowingly causes or aids another person to attempt suicide."
WASH. REv. CODE. ANN. § 9A.36.060 (West 1995). Promoting a suicide attempt is a class C
felony, id., punishable by imprisonment for a maximum of five years and a fine of up to
$10,000, id. § 9A.20.020. This is the pattern common in most U.S. jurisdictions. See, e.g.,
THE NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, WHEN DEATH IS SOUGHT: ASSISTED
SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT 59-60 (1994) [hereinafter TASK FORCE].

2. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1456 (W.D. Wash. 1994),
rev'd, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir.), reh'g granted en banc, 62 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd, No. 9435534, 1996 WL 94848 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 1996) (en banc); see also infra notes 45, 178 (discussing the Ninth Circuit's en banc decision).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 1458.
5. Id. Compassion in Dying limits its services to terminally ill patients capable of understanding their own decisions. Id. It will not help patients who request assisted suicide
as a result of emotional distress or mental illness, lack of adequate health insurance or
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Dr. Roe and Compassion in Dying are two of the many voices
that, in recent years, have sought recognition of the powerful interests
that terminally ill people have in controlling the circumstances of
their own death. Many people with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) intentionally hasten death, and even more consider it
and talk openly about it.6 In 1991 the prestigious New EnglandJournal
of Medicine published an article by Dr. Timothy Quill describing cases
in which he had helped terminally ill patients to die.7 Also in 1991,
Derek Humphry, founder of the Hemlock Society, published Final
Exit, providing detailed information about how to commit suicide.8
Within a week the book rose to the top of the New York Times best

other economic concerns, inadequate comfort or care, or clinical depression. Id. The
patient must request assistance
personally, in writing or on videotape, and [the request] must be repeated three
times, with an interval of at least 48 hours between the second and third requests.
Requests may not be made through advance directives or by a health care surrogate, attorney-in-fact, or any other person.... Compassion in Dying will not assist
anyone . . . who expresses any ambivalence or uncertainty. If the patient has
immediate family members or other close personal friends, their approval must
be obtained. If any members of the immediate family express disapproval, Compassion in Dying will not provide assistance with suicide.
Id. A consulting physician must verify the patient's terminal prognosis, decision-making
capability, and optimal management of pain and depression. Id.
6. Another plaintiff in Compassion in Dying was a 44-year-old artist in the terminal
phase of his struggle with AIDS. Id. at 1456. See generallyJody B. Gabel, Releasefrom Terminal Suffering?: The Impact of AIDS on Medically Assisted Suicide Legislation, 22 FLA. ST. U. L.
REv. 369, 431 (1994) (summarizing data on Human Immuno-Deficiency Virus (HIV) and
suicide and supporting a Model Death with Dignity Act that would "ensure that societal
pressure is not exerted upon people suffering from terminal illnesses to opt for medically
assisted suicide based merely upon their medical diagnosis or financial situation, rather
than their personal choice"). People working with AIDS patients report that most consider
controlling the circumstances of their death, and begin gathering lethal drugs at the time
they are diagnosed. Lisa Belkin, DoctorsDebate Helping the Terminally Ill Die, N.Y. TIMES, May
24, 1989, at Al; Leslie Knowlton, A Time for Dying? Rather Than Face a Horrible, Lingering
Death, Some AIDS Patients Say They Plan to End Their Lives. For Them, It's a Way of Keeping
Control, L.A. TIMES, July 19, 1994, at El; Gina Kolata, AIDS Patients Seek Solace in Suicide but
Many Risk Added Pain in Failure,N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1994, at C1.
7. Timothy E. Quill, Death and Dignity: A Case of Individualized Decision Making, 324
NEW ENG. J. MED. 691 (1991) [hereinafter Quill, Death and Dignity]. New York authorities
declined to bring disciplinary proceedings because the doctor could not "know with certainty" that his patient would use the drugs he prescribed to take her own life. "Dr.
Timothy Quill," Determination of the New York State Board for Professional Medical Conduct, Aug. 16, 1991, at 2, as reported in TASK FORCE, supranote 1, at 66-67. In a subsequent
article, Dr. Quill explored his motivations, recognizing that "intent" is complex and multilayered. Timothy E. Quill, The Ambiguity of Clinical Intentions, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1039
(1993) [hereinafter Quill, The Ambiguity of Clinical Intentions]. Dr. Quill subsequently filed
an affirmative challenge to New York's ban on assisted suicide. See infra note 126.
8. DEREK HUMPHRY, FINAL EXIT (1991).
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seller list for how-to books.9 In 1994 Connecticut Magazine published a
story about William Meyer III, age sixty-five, describing how he had
helped his eighty-eight-year-old, terminally ill father to die."0 In 1994
Oregon voters approved a referendum authorizing physician-assisted
suicide for the terminally ill, under standards similar to those applied
by Compassion in Dying."1 In 1995 the New Yorker published Andrew
Solomon's powerful and sympathetic story of how he, his brother, and
father helped his mother to die.' 2
Dr. Roe's claim that the Washington ban on assisted suicide violates her constitutional right to hasten her death depends on the analysis of two questions. First, are Dr. Roe's decision and her actions a
constitutionally protected form of liberty or privacy? Second, assuming that Dr. Roe's choice is an aspect of personal liberty, does the
State of Washington have sufficient reason to restrict her choice and
action? These are the core issues that courts address in every case in
9. Humphry commented that the success of his book "legitimized everything by making money." Andrew Solomon, A Death of One's Own, NEW YORKER, May 22, 1995, at 54, 59.
10. Son's Story Prompts Examination ofDeath, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Sept. 17, 1994, at
16A. The father, suffering from cancer, attempted suicide on his own and failed, and then
asked his son to help him. Id. The son held his father's arms as the father struggled to
remove a plastic bag that he had placed over his own head. Id. Mr. Meyer was prosecuted
for second-degree manslaughter. Id. Although the crime charged carried a 10-year prison
sentence, Mr. Meyer was released on two years' probation after he promised not to assist
any other suicides and to donate $1000 in his father's name to a prison youth program.
Man Put on Probationfor Aiding Dad's Suicide, Mitami HERALD, Dec. 16, 1994, at IlA.
11. The Oregon Death with Dignity Act provides that
An adult who is capable, is a resident of Oregon, and has been determined by the
attending physician and consulting physician to be suffering from a terminal disease, and who has voluntarily expressed his or her wish to die, may make a written
request for medication for the purpose of ending his or her life in a humane and
dignified manner in accordance with this Act.
1995 OR. LAWS ch. 2, § 2.01. The Act requires that the patient make 2 requests, at least 15
days apart. Id. § 3.06. Unlike Compassion in Dying's standards, the Oregon Act does not
demand that the patient's pain be untreatable. Id. § 3.01. It does, however, require doctors to determine "that the person is not suffering from a psychiatric or psychological disorder, or depression causing impaired judgment." Id. § 3.03. On December 27, 1994, a
federal court issued a preliminary injunction against the referendum. Lee v. Oregon, 869
F. Supp. 1491, 1503 (D. Or. 1994).
12. Solomon, supra note 9, at 54. When Mr. Solomon's mother was diagnosed with
cancer, she made it plain that she thought she would choose death at some point. Id. at
56. Like Dr. Roe, she did not act quickly, but underwent months of aggressive treatment.
Id. "[H]er hair was gone, her skin was allergic to any makeup, her body was emaciated,
and her eyes were ringed with perpetual exhaustion." Id. at 58. Nonetheless she continued to struggle to live, saying,
As long as there is even a remote chance of my getting well, I'll go on with treatments. When they say that they are keeping me alive but without any chance of
recovery, then I'll stop. When it's time, we'll all know. I won't do anything before
then. Meanwhile, I plan to enjoy whatever time there is left.
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which an individual claims that a state policy unconstitutionally restricts or burdens individual liberty. 3
A.

Physician-Assisted Death as a Constitutionally Protected Liberty

Since the end of World War II, the Supreme Court has drawn
distinctions between individual liberty or privacy rights that can be
identified as "fundamental" and those that can be defined as opportunities for social or economic advantage. If the individual liberty is
"fundamental," the state must demonstrate strong and precise, or
"compelling," justification for restricting it.' 4 By contrast, the state
may restrict the exercise of ordinary, nonfundamental liberties if it
can assert some rational basis to support the restriction, or if the court
can construct a hypothetical application that would make the law reasonable.' 5 This traditional approach has eroded in recent years. In
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Court recognized the right to choose
abortion as fundamental, 6 but allowed state restrictions in the ab13. In many cases, courts also consider the nature of the burden imposed on the individual liberty. A law that makes it more difficult or costly to exercise a protected liberty
might be upheld even though a law that prohibited exercise of the claimed liberty would
be unconstitutional. The issue is whether the burden is undue. See, e.g., Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2807 (1992) (affirming that a criminal prohibition
against abortion violates women's constitutionally protected liberty, but holding that state
regulations are permissible so long as the burdens imposed thereby are not undue); see also
infra notes 217, 220.
Because Dr. Roe and Compassion in Dying challenge a criminal law that prohibits
assisted death in allcircumstances, there is no dispute that the law imposes a significant
burden. Were courts or legislatures to recognize a basic right to choose to hasten death, it
would be necessary to confront a second generation of problems. It is easy to imagine
circumstances in which the Compassion in Dying criteria, supra note 5, would seem irrationally restrictive. For example, Compassion in Dying demands consensus among "immediate family members" and "close personal friends." See supra note 5. Although the
impulse to require participation and dialogue among those who love the dying person
seems wise, serious problems arise when one member of the immediate family or one close
personal friend holds views in conflict with those of the dying person and all the others
who love her. Should that person be given a veto power? In Casey, the Supreme Court
considered, and rejected, Pennsylvania's rule that husbands should be guaranteed the opportunity to participate in their wife's decision whether to have an abortion. 112 S.Ct. at
2826-33. This Article does not address these second-generation issues.
14. Both "fundamental liberty" and "compelling state interests" are terms of art in
American constitutional jurisprudence. Fundamental liberties include the rights to free
speech, religious expression, travel, marriage, family formation, procreation, and use of
contraceptives. Compelling state interests are those of such pressing import that they may
encroach on an individual's fundamental liberty, if pursued by the most narrowly tailored
means. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw §§ 11-2 to -5, at 772-84 (2d
ed. 1988).
15. Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (upholding a law restricting
the practice of optometry).
16. 112 S.Ct. at 2804.
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sence of a compelling state interest, so long as no undue burden is
imposed on the exercise of the liberty.' 7
This dichotomy between fundamental individual rights of privacy
and liberty, on the one hand, and state authority over social and economic relations, on the other, reflects the common understanding of
major historic developments of the twentieth century. Judicial deference to democratic regulation of economic relations evolved from the
social, political, and constitutional rejection of the Supreme Court's
effort to use the Constitution to block the New Deal legislative reforms.18 Judicial affirmation of fundamental personal rights of liberty
and privacy reflects our collective human understanding that the
atrocities authorized by the "law" of the Hitler and Stalin regimes violated fundamental human rights.1 9 Yet one cannot easily distinguish
between fundamental individual rights of privacy and liberty, which
the state may not deny without powerful justification, and ordinary
economic and social self-interest, over which the state has broad regulatory power. 20
Dr. Roe and others in her situation present considerations that
touch upon many aspects of human liberty and privacy. First, the core
of this dilemma is the individual's desire to retain control over his or
her body and life. As Ronald Dworkin explains,
Death has dominion because it is not only the start of nothing but the end of everything, and how we think and talk
about dying-the emphasis we put on dying with "dignity"shows how important it is that life ends appropriately, that
death keeps faith with the way we want to have lived.
Second, the right to choice is valuable, however that choice is exercised.2 2 The dying patient has lost control of most significant aspects
of his or her life. The assurance that assisted death is an option provides a measure of autonomy and control, however that autonomy is

17. Id. at 2821.
18. Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J.
1013, 1055 (1984).
19. Edward V. Sparer, FundamentalHuman Rights, Legal Entitlements, and the Social Struggle: A Friendly Critique of the CriticalLegal Studies Movement, 36 STAN. L. REv.509 (1984).

20. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
21. RONALD DWORK1N, LIFE'S DOMINION 199 (1993).

22. As an abortion rights litigator, I have known women who sought an abortion, became plaintiffs challenging state restrictions, obtained temporary injunctive relief allowing
access to abortion, yet decided to continue the pregnancy. Whatever course the woman
chooses, an important right is vindicated by the affirmation that the choice is hers.
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exercised.2" Indeed, evidence from medical practice suggests that
frank recognition and discussion of the suicide option sometimes
leads depressed patients to reject it.24
Third, prohibitions on physician-assisted dying enforce individual
isolation and prevent individuals from seeking the help and companionship of others at a critical time.2 5 Andrew Solomon reports that his
mother
considered doing the whole thing on her own but had
thought that the shock would be worse than the memories of
having been with her for this experience. As for us, we
wanted to be there. My mother's life was in other people,
and we all hated the idea of her dying alone. It was important that in my mother's last months on earth we all feel connected, that none of us2 6be left with a sense of secrets kept
and intentions hidden.
When suicide is allowed, 7 but help in dying is prohibited, the state
denies important associational interests.
Fourth, it is not easy to hasten death in a private, non-violent way.
Bans on physician assistance, therefore, aggravate the suffering of people such as Dr. Jane Roe. Solomon reports,
23. Andrew Solomon reports, "Everything that had been intolerable to my mother was
made tolerable when she got those pills, by the sure knowledge that when life became
unlivable it would stop." Solomon, supranote 9, at 58; see also Franklin G. Miller &John C.
Fletcher, The Case for Legalized Euthanasia, 36 PERSP. IN BIOLOGY & MED. 159, 164 (1993);

Timothy E. Quill et al., Careof the Hopelessly 111. ProposedClinical Criterafor Physician-Assisted
Suicide, 327 NEW ENG.J. MED. 1380, 1382 (1992).

24. TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 26; see also Quill et al., supra note 23, at 1382.
25. Raymond Duff and August Hollingshead, in their classic Yale-New Haven Hospital
study, report that while affluent white men were routinely informed when their condition
was terminal so that they could settle affairs and communicate with loved ones, non-whites,
women, and the less affluent were left to face death on their own. RAYMOND DUFF & AuGUS-I HOLLINGSHEAD, SICKNESS AND SocIErY 314-18 (1968).
26. Solomon, supra note 9, at 64. Similarly, Dr. Timothy Quill offers this reflection on
the death of Diane, the long-term patient to whom he had provided barbiturates:
I did not want her to have to face this final moment alone. Had she asked me to
be with her, and had I complied, the legal risk of my participation would have
increased substantially. She died alone as a final altruistic act to protect both her
family and me from potential prosecution. She researched the law in the state of
New York and rightly discovered that the legal risk of the assisters increases dramatically if they are present at the time of death. I hope I would have had the
courage to be there with her had she requested my presence, for no one should
feel forced to die alone.
Quill, The Ambiguity of Clinical Intentions, supra note 7, at 1040.
27. See infra text accompanying note 53 (noting that suicide and attempted suicide are
no longer crimes in any jurisdiction).
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If you have never tried it or helped someone else through it,
you cannot begin to imagine how difficult it is to kill yourself.... Having been through the whole business, I would
put the infrequency of suicide down more to the difficulty of
it than to the undesirability of its objective. 8
It is, of course, possible to jump off a tall building or to leap in front
of an oncoming train. 29 But most terminally ill patients seek a death
that is both more private and less violent.3 0 Patients who unsuccessfully attempt to hasten death are often subjected to serious
indignity. 1
Do these individual interests constitute a liberty protected by the
Constitution? The process of determining whether an asserted liberty
is constitutionally protected is complex. Generally, the Court looks to
our history and traditions to determine the contours of the protected
liberty. Justice Harlan provided a classic statement of this principle, in
arguing that the Constitution protects the right of married people to
use contraceptives.
Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its content cannot be determined by reference to any code. The
best that can be said is that through the course of this
Court's decisions it has represented the balance which our
Nation, built on postulates of respect for the liberty of the
individual, has struck between that liberty and the demands
of organized society.... The balance of which I speak is the
balance struck by this country, having regard to what history
teaches are the traditions from which it developed as well as
the traditions from which it broke. That tradition is a living
thing. . . . No formula could serve
as a substitute, in this
32
area, for judgment and restraint.
28. Solomon, supra note 9, at 64; see also Kolata, supra note 6, at C4.
29. Professor Seth F. Kreimer observes that "as long as guns, plastic bags, and tall buildings are freely available, most people have the practical capacity to kill themselves." Seth F.
Kreimer, Does Pro-ChoiceMean Kevorkian? An Essay on Roe, Casey and the Right to Die, 44 Am.

U. L. REv. 803, 818 (1995). While true, Professor Kreimer's observation may unduly devalue the interests, and physical infirmities, of people like Dr. Jane Roe and Andrew Solomon's mother.
30. Solomon, supra note 9, at 57.
31. Some people must repeat their farewells a second time to the same group of intimates. In some cases irreplaceable pills are regurgitated. One woman said,
My husband had to just eat his vomit. He was that determined. But then he
threw up again. We waited about an hour, then he downed it all again and I put a
plastic bag over his head so he would suffocate before he got sick, and he finally
died.
Solomon, supra note 9, at 57.
32. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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Justice Powell has endorsed the historical approach in affirming
that a grandmother's right to maintain a home for her grandchildren
is a constitutionally protected liberty that cannot be sacrificed to local
zoning concerns. Arguing in response to Justice White's concern that
such an approach would prove too expansive and would overly
broaden the scope of the Due Process Clause, Justice Powell wrote,
"To the contrary, an approach grounded in history imposes limits on
the judiciary that are more meaningful than any based on [an] abstract formula .. .
By contrast, Justice Scalia believes that claims of constitutional liberty should be resolved by reference "to the most specific level at
which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the
asserted right can be identified. 3' 4 However, Justice Scalia's narrow
approach to the identification of fundamental liberties has been rejected by the Court.3 5
The Court has recognized many fundamental liberties not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution. For example, the Court has recognized a right of parents to assume primary responsibility for childrearing, because this "is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition."36 Similarly, the citizen's right to travel from
state to state, 7 or to travel abroad, the right to marry, 9 free access
to the voting booth,40 and rights of procreational choice4 1 have all
been recognized as constitutionally protected liberties, although not
explicitly mentioned in the Constitution.
Whether Dr. Roe's decision to hasten her death with the help of
her physician is a liberty that the state may not deny without powerful
33. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504 n.12 (1977).
34. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127-28 n.6 (1989).
35. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct_ 2791, 2804-07 (1992).
36. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972); see alsoPierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925) (striking a law that required parents to send their children to public
school); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (affirming a parent's right to teach his or
her child in a foreign language).
37. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (holding it unconstitutional for a
state to deny welfare benefits to new residents); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa, 415 U.S. 250
(1974) (declaring state denial of nonemergency medical care to indigent new residents
unconstitutional).
38. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
39. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (striking a law that prohibited people
from marrying if they had not met their child-support obligations).
40. Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (finding a state poll
tax unconstitutional).
41. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (forced sterilization); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (contraception); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct.
2791 (1992) (abortion).
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justification depends on the interpretation of general constitutional
law principles, and an analysis of the similarities and differences between the right asserted here and those recognized in prior cases.
Two prior cases are most probative in evaluating Dr. Roe's claim of
constitutionally protected liberty-Planned Parenthood v. Casey, affirming the constitutional protection of the right to choose abortion;" and Cruzan v. Director,Missouri Departmentof Health, recognizing
"that the United States Constitution would grant a competent person
a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and
nutrition."

43

In PlannedParenthood v. Casey, the Court explained:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to
personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of
liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence,
of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of
the State. 44
In Compassion in Dying, the district court relied on the reasoning
in Casey in concluding that "the suffering of a terminally ill person
cannot be deemed any less intimate or personal, or any less deserving
of protection from unwarranted governmental interference, than that
of a pregnant woman." 4' The Compassion in Dying court found that
42. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2791.
43. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990). In his majority
opinion, ChiefJustice Rehnquist assumed that such a right exists for the purposes of the
case before the Court. He acknowledged that this principle "may be inferred from our
prior decisions," id. at 278, and that "the logic of the cases... would embrace such a liberty
interest," id. at 279. Because the majority did not see the right as "fundamental," it was
willing to defer to the state's requirement of a heightened standard of proof, denying the
right to refuse life-supporting treatment unless the comatose patient's choice to do so is
supported by "clear and convincing" evidence. Id. at 285-87.
The four dissenting Justices, Brennan, Blackmun, Marshall, and Stevens, took issue
with the majority's refusal to characterize the liberty as "fundamental." Id. at 302-05 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Because they characterized the choice as fundamental, they would
allow state restrictions only where such restrictions promote important state interests. Id.
at 303. If accuracy in determining the patient's wishes is the primary concern, a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard is more likely to produce accurate decisions about the
patient's wishes. Id. at 315-26.
44. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807.
45. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1460 (W.D. Wash. 1994),
rev'd, 49 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir.), reh'ggrantedenbance 62 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd, No.
94-35534, 1996 WL 94848 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 1996) (en banc). As this Article went to press,
the Ninth Circuit en banc upheld the decision of the district court and reversed the deci-
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"t] here is no more profoundly personal decision, nor one which is
closer to the heart of personal liberty, than the choice which a terminally ill person makes to end his or her suffering and hasten an inevitable death."4 6
Similarly, in Cruzan,Justice O'Connor's pivotal concurrence recognizes that
[r]equiring a competent adult to endure [artificial feeding]
against her will burdens the patient's liberty, dignity, and
freedom to determine the course of her own treatment. Accordingly, the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause
must protect, if it protects anything, an individual's deeply
personal decision to reject medical treatment, including the
artificial delivery of food and water.4 7
The Supreme Court's reasoning in Cruzan also supports the distinction, implicit in Dr. Roe's claim, between the liberty interests of
the healthy and the interests of those suffering from an irreversible,
and imminently terminal, illness. The Cruzan Court observed, "We do
not think a State is required to remain neutral in the face of an informed and voluntary decision by a physically able adult to starve to
death."48
A claim that terminally ill individuals have a liberty interest in
access to physician assistance in hastening death is, of course, distinguishable from all the other liberties that previously have been recogsion of the three judge circuit court panel. Compassion in Dying, No. 94-35534, 1996 WL
94848. Judge Reinhardt wrote the opinion for eight judges and three judges dissented.
The court found that both Casey and Cruzan support the claim that physician assistance in
dying is a form of fundamental liberty and that none of the interests asserted by the state
were sufficiently strong to justify a criminal prohibition on such physician assistance. Id. at
*37-39.
The Second Circuit also recently struck down New York's criminal statute prohibiting
assisted suicide on Equal Protection grounds, holding that the state had no rational basis
for distinguishing between competent, terminally ill patients who may legally refuse medical treatment and patients who choose to end their lives by self-administration of drugs
prescribed by their physicians. Quill v. Vacco, No. 60. 95-7028, 1996 WL 148605, at *11,
*14-17 (2d Cir. April 2, 1996).
After the Ninth Circuit panel's initial decision, a U.S. District Court found that a constitutional right to privacy protects patient choice regarding physician assistance in dying.
Kevorkian v. Arnett, No. CV 94-6089, CBM, at 22 (C.D. Cal. 1995). The Kevorkian court,
recognizing that it was bound by the Ninth Circuit's holding that physician-assisted suicide
was not a constitutionally protected liberty, nonetheless found that a constitutional right of
privacy protects patient choice. Id. at 21-22. The court seems to believe that labeling the
claim as one of "privacy" rather than "liberty" makes critical constitutional difference. I am
not convinced.
46. 850 F. Supp. at 1461.
47. 497 U.S. at 289 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
48. Id. at 280.
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nized as deserving constitutional protection, just as all the liberties
recognized in prior cases are distinguishable from one another. The
relevant question is whether, as a matter of constitutional principle,
these distinctions should make a difference. There are two primary
arguments that distinguish the terminally ill patient's claimed right to
choose assistance in hastening death from the patient's right to refuse
essential medical care. First, our history and traditions do not support
the decisions of terminally ill people who seek actively to hasten
death; and second, the affirmative actions involved are significantly
different from the rejection of essential medical care.
Our history and traditions provide much stronger support for the
individual's right to refuse essential medical treatment than for the
individual's right to physician-assisted dying.4 9 In Cruzan, the Court
relied on the long-standing, common-law tradition of protecting the
individual's right to refuse medical treatment to conclude that the
Constitution also protects the individual's right to refuse essential
medical care.5" The Court, however, has not adopted a static view of
our history and traditions in determining the content of constitutionally protected personal liberties.5 1 Often, constitutional liberties are
recognized despite the state's denial of the claimed liberty; for example, the constitutional right to choose abortion has been protected
despite persistent state efforts to deny it.5 2

49. The Ninth Circuit panel that originally reversed the Washington District Court decision, noted, "In the two hundred and five years of our existence no constitutional right to
aid in killing oneself has ever been asserted and upheld by a court of final jurisdiction."
Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 591.
50. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269-78.
51. See supra text accompanying notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
52. For a discussion of the history of the abortion controversy, see Planned Parenthood
v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2810-12 (1992). But see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-94
(1986) (5-4 decision) (relying on a static view of history and the meaning of constitutional
liberty to reject a challenge to the Georgia sodomy statute). The reasoning of Bowers has
been widely condemned. See RICHARD POSNER, SEX AND REASON 291-23 (1992); Anne B.
Goldstein, History, Homosexuality, and Political Values: Searchingfor the HiddenDeterminantsof
Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE LJ. 1073 (1988);Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act
and Identity In and After Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REv. 1721, 1745-70 (1993); Nan D.
Hunter, Life After Hardwick, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. Rv. 531 (1992); Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 187; Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97YALE L.J. 1493 (1988);Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REv. 737, 74750 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientationand the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship
Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHi. L. REv. 1161 (1989); Kendall Thomas,
Beyond the Privacy Principle,92 COLUM. L. REv. 1431, 1461-67 (1992). Justice Powell, the
critical swing vote in Bowers, has indicated that he believes the case was wrongly decided.
Linda Greenhouse, Washington Talk: When Second Thoughts in Case Come Too Late, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 5, 1990, at A14.
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Furthermore, our history and traditions do not reflect a consistent condemnation of suicide. Suicide and attempted suicide are not
crimes today in any jurisdiction, and have not been for most of this
century.53 This suggests that the continued condemnation of physician-assisted dying reflects a concern about the risk of abuse, rather
than a moral consensus that suicide is always wrong. In addition, it is
not clear that physician-assisted dying, even though criminally prohibited, is inconsistent with our history and traditions. For obvious reasons, it is impossible to know how widespread the practice is, but
evidence suggests that doctors have long helped to hasten the death
of terminally ill patients.5 4
The second argument distinguishing the claim of a constitutionally protected right to physician-assisted dying from Cruzan's recognition of the right to refuse necessary medical treatment rests on the
difference between asserting autonomy and resisting intrusion. Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Cruzan characterizes the right as one
against "invasions into the body" and "restraint and intrusion."5 5 For
people such as Dr. Roe, the state's proscription is not itself a physical
intrusion on their bodily integrity, but instead bars the individual
from permitting a lethal intrusion as a final assertion of that integrity.
While the "invasion" paradigm governs Cruzan, Casey recognizes a
broader right of "personal autonomy and bodily integrity" that is not
limited to a right to resist state-mandated intrusions.5 6 In the context
of this broader right, a prohibition of assisted dying might be characterized as an infringement on personal autonomy in conflict with the
requirement that states respect self-determination in matters of core
identity.5 7
This distinction between resisting intrusion and asserting autonomy is also captured by the claim that the right to refuse necessary
Nonetheless, the court in Quill v. Koppell, 870 F. Supp. 78, 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) relied
on Bowers in rejecting the plaintiffs' claim that constitutionally protected liberty encompasses the right to physician-assisted suicide. Id. at 85.
53. TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 54-55.
54. SeeJulia Pugliese, Don't Ask-Don't Tell The Secret Practiceof Physician-AssistedSuicide,
44 HASTINGS L.J. 1291, 1297-99 (1993); Quill, Death and Dignity, supra note 7, at 694. "Doctors readily concede that they are deliberately helping their patients to die when they write
prescriptions for lethal doses of Seconal, but then they ask not to be quoted by name."
Solomon, supra note 9, at 68.
55. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 287 (1990) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
56. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2798.
57. Justice O'Connor's Cruzan concurrence gives some support to this notion as well.
She writes that "our notions of liberty are inextricably entwined with our idea of physical
freedom and self-determination." 497 U.S. at 287.
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medical treatment is passive, while right-to-die claims involve affirmative action to hasten death. The active/passive distinction has widespread appeal to notions of common sense, as well as to legal and
philosophical theories.5 8 At the same time, it has been widely criticized as irrational, unseemly, suspect, and eccentric.5 9
In sum, Dr. Roe can make a very strong claim that her liberty
interest in physician-assisted dying deserves constitutional protection.
The existence of a liberty interest or fundamental right does not, however, imply that the state may never place constraints on its exercise. 6 °
It does demand that the state explain why the individual liberty must
be restricted. The next section evaluates the state concerns that might

58. The active/passive distinction forms the basis for the classic no-duty tort law principle. See Hurley v. Eddingfield, 59 N.E. 1058 (Ind. 1901).
59. See, e.g., JAMES RACHELS, THE END OF LIFE: EUTHANASIA AND MORALITY 92-105
(1986) (challenging the traditional medical distinction between killing and letting one die,
and arguing for an equivalence based on the lack of moral difference between the two);
Leslie Bender, A Feminist Analysis of Physician-AssistedDying and Voluntay Active Euthanasia,
59 TENN. L. REv. 519, 531 (1992) ("It is unseemly for the legal system's analysis to turn on
whether the physician's role was active or passive .... "); Sanford H. Kadish, LettingPatients
Die: Legal and Moral Reflections, 80 CAL. L. REv. 857, 864-65 (1992) (arguing that application of the act/omission distinction is "suspect" and "eccentric at best"); Kreimer, supra
note 29, at 839 (noting that "[t]he active/passive distinction is, at best, problematic"). For
early criticism of the no duty principle in the tort context, see Francis H. Bohlen, The Moral
Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U. PA. L. REv. 217 (1908).
60. See supra text accompanying notes 14-17. My colleague, Professor Thomas Nagel,
has suggested to me in conversations that it is confusing and inappropriate to characterize
the claimed right as one to "physician-assisted dying" or "intentionally hastened death"
rather than a more general right to commit suicide. His point is that even healthy young
people might assert a liberty interest in choosing whether or not to live. As I understand
his argument, the fact that a state interest in denying the claimed individual liberty might
differ in various cases does not make the claim of individual liberty fundamentally
different.
Two reasons persuade me to reject Professor Nagel's construction of the problem.
First, terminally ill people who protest laws that prohibit them from defining the circumstances of their own death do not define their claim as one that encompasses every individual's right to commit suicide. Indeed, they struggle with the question of appropriate
limits. As a plaintiffs' lawyer, I am influenced by clients' definitions of issues. Second,
every liberty/privacy case considered by the Supreme Court has been cast in less than
universal terms. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), considered whether the
state could prohibit doctors from prescribing contraceptives to married couples. Id. at 48081. The plaintiffs' claim in Griswold could have been cast as one challenging any state
restriction on sexual behavior, whether the people involved were married or single, heterosexual or homosexual. Our common-law/constitutional methodology allows consideration
of liberty claims one step at a time.
Professor Nagel would characterize this right as the right to "commit suicide." Activists in the right-to-die movement prefer "physician-assisted dying" or "intentionally hastened death." I have adopted the plaintiffs' language, except where context makes clear
that the claim is a broader one.
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justify denying Dr. Roe the liberty to seek her doctor's help in hastening her death.
B.

State Interests in Banning Physician-Assisted Dying

Three arguments support state prohibitions of physician-assisted
dying: (1) to protect vulnerable individuals from coercion; (2) to promote individuals' best interests; and (3) to affirm the sanctity of life.
1. Coercion.-The ban on assisted dying protects people who
might be coerced to "choose" death against their own authentic
wishes. Andrew Solomon's eloquent argument in support of legalizing assisted death recognizes that, "There is no question that if euthanasia is legalized it will be abused. Some people will kill themselves
because of family pressure to do so. Some will kill themselves in depression. Some will kill themselves too soon, and lose precious time
on earth."6 The prestigious New York Task Force on Life and the
Law recommended against legalizing physician-assisted dying:
The risk of harm is greatest for the many individuals in our
society whose autonomy and well-being are already compromised by poverty, lack of access to good medical care, advanced age, or membership in a stigmatized social group.
The risks of legalizing assisted suicide and euthanasia for
these individuals, in a health care system and society that
cannot effectively protect against the impact of inadequate
resources and6 2 ingrained social disadvantages, would be
extraordinary.
The role of the medical profession in legitimating the decision to
hasten death is a matter of particular concern. The Ninth Circuit
panel initially rejected Dr. Roe's constitutional claim, in part, because
"[o]nce the physician suggests suicide or euthanasia, some patients
will feel that they have few, if any alternatives, but to accept the
recommendation."6 3
Some of the most well-known proponents of physician-assisted dying act in ways that confirm these concerns. In 1988 the Journalof the
American Medical Association published an anonymous article by a gynecological resident who described giving a lethal injection to a twenty61. Solomon, supra note 9, at 68.
62. TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 120.
63. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 592 (9th Cir.) (quoting TASK
FORCE, supra note 1, at 122), reh'ggranteden banc, 62 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd, No. 9435534, 1996 WL 94848 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 1996) (en banc); see also supra note 45 (discussing
the Ninth Circuit's en banc decision).
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year-old woman named Debbie who was dying of ovarian cancer.64 He
was called to her bedside in the middle of the night because she was
in great pain. 65 He had never before met the patient.' She said,
"Let's get this over with. ' 67 The resident administered a lethal morphine injection.6" The column generated over 150 responses that ran
four to one against the actions of the physician and three to one
against the Journal for publishing the piece. 69 Examples of these arguments include: The doctor did not know the patient. She may have
felt the same way the next morning, or perhaps not. The doctor does
not assure us that he had done all that was possible to deal with her
symptoms. Neither the Compassion in Dying guidelines7" nor the Oregon law would have authorized the actions of this physician. 7
Dr. Jack Kevorkian is the best known proponent of physician-assisted dying and a source of deep disquiet to the organized movement
that seeks social and constitutional acceptance of this right. 72 In response to Dr. Kevorkian,73 the Michigan legislature passed a law
prohibiting assisted suicide.74 The Michigan Supreme Court upheld
that law and the U.S. Supreme Court denied review.7 5 Even though
his conduct has been defined as criminal, 76 Dr. Kevorkian has remained free and has persisted in helping people to die.7 7 In 1991 the
state sought an injunction to prevent him from assisting patients to
64. It's
Over, Debbie, 259JAMA 272 (1988).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. George D. Lundberg, 'It's Over, Debbie' and the EuthanasiaDebate, 259 JAMA 2142
(1988).
70. See supra note 5.
71. See supra note 11.
72. Solomon, supra note 9, at 62.
Though he is to outsiders [of the right to die movement] the highest-profile figure in the right-to-die movement, his behavior is so erratic and his personality so
bizarre that most other members of the movement go to considerable lengths to
distance themselves from him. "He speaks to the American need for a quick fix,"
... . Unlike most advocates of aid-in-dying, Kevorkian flouts the law like a
showman.
Id.
73. The Assisted-Suicide Debate, DET. FREE PRESS, June 3, 1995, at 6A.
74. MICH. COMP. LAws. ANN. § 752.1027 (West Supp. 1995).
75. People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994), cert. denied sub nom. Hobbins v.
Kelley, 115 S. Ct. 1795 (1995).
76. Id. at 716.
77. Michael Betzold & Matt Davis, Kevorkian Cases May Reopen, DET. FREE PRESS, Dec. 15,
1994, at lB.
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commit suicide.78 The court entered the injunction in response to
Dr. Kevorkian's actions in helpingJanet Adkins to hasten her death.79
Ms. Adkins had been diagnosed with Alzheimer's disease. 0 However,
it is interesting that the court relied on the specific circumstances of
Dr. Kevorkian's actions, rather than on the abstract principle that the
state is free to deny people the right to physician-assisted dying. The
Michigan Court of Appeals stated:
[The] defendant is by education and training a retired
pathologist without any experience or any knowledge in the
fields of internal medicine, geriatric medicine, psychiatry,
neurology, or other areas that might be helpful in diagnosing and managing Alzheimer's disease.... [D]efendant was
not professionally qualified to evaluate the physical or emotional status of Ms. Adkins. . . . [D]efendant made no attempt to take a comprehensive medical history, conduct a
physical examination, order any tests, assess Ms. Adkins'
medical status, or consult with experts.... Ms. Adkins, who
was fifty-four years old, was neither imminently terminally ill
nor suffering from pain.... [S] he had played tennis within
days of her death.... [D]efendant made no real effort to
discover whether Ms. Adkins wished to end her life, relying
largely on the statements of her husband and a few limited
responses from Ms. Adkins. 8
As Professor Seth Kreimer argues, pro-choice does not necessarily imply support for Dr. Kevorkian. 82 Compassion in Dying and most other
supporters of repealing the ban on physician-assisted suicide are un83
comfortable with his practices.
While the concerns about coercion are powerful, they are
strongly and precisely addressed by the policies of Compassion in Dying8 4 and the Oregon law. 5 The question becomes whether a ban on
assisted dying is a necessary or appropriate means of assuring that
these decisions are not motivated by lack of treatment for pain or depression, or other factors that undermine individual autonomy. If
there were no other, more precisely tailored, means of avoiding
abuse, this argument would have force. But that does not seem to be
78. People ex rel. Oakland County Prosecuting Attorney v. Kevorkian, 534 N.W.2d 172,
173 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
79. Id. at 173-74.
80. Id. at 173.
81. Id. at 174.
82., See supra note 29.
83. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
84. See supra note 5.
85. See supra note 11.
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the case. Rather, it seems plausible that the practical concerns about
coercion and abuse might better be addressed by legalizing physicianassisted dying and regulating it through policies like those of Compassion in Dying, or the Oregon Death with Dignity Act, 86 rather than
87
allowing it to continue illicitly and without institutional safeguards.
The argument that if a physician is legally free to help a terminally ill patient hasten death, patients will feel compelled to choose
this course 88 reflects an appalling view of the doctor-patient relationship, inconsistent with the core ethical and legal premises of informed
consent. 8 9 Doctors should not "suggest" answers to basic life decisions. They should not "suggest" hastened death, or abortion, or indeed, having a baby or enlarging one's breasts. 90 These are choices
for the patient. Even if the patient "suggests" hastened death, Compassion in Dying's guidelines require that the physician ensure that
the "choice" is not driven by treatable depression or pain, or other
forms of coercion. 9 '
Problems of coercion are particularly pressing in the case of people who are mentally incompetent. The Compassion in Dying guidelines and the Oregon statute both provide that mentally incompetent
people may not be allowed to choose physician-assisted dying.9 2 Mentally disabled people, and those who work with them, have often opposed legalization of physician-assisted dying on the grounds that the
mentally incompetent are at particular risk of abuse, and that laws
distinguishing between the competent and incompetent draw invidious distinctions." Other advocates for the mentally disabled argue
that if there is a general right to physician-assisted dying, it is unfair
and demeaning to deny it to the mentally incompetent, at least in the
case of once-competent individuals who made their wishes plainly
86. See supra notes 5, 11.
87. The current status of physician-assisted dying parallels, in many ways, that of prelegalization abortion. Abortions were performed, but because they were illegal, they were
costly, clandestine, and often of poor quality. Many doctors came to support the movement to legalize abortion because they saw and had to treat the consequences of unsafe,
unsanitary, and poorly performed abortions. See, e.g., KRIsTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE
POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD chs. 2-4 (1984).

88. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 592 (9th Cir.), reh'g granted en
bane, 62 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd, No. 94-35534, 1996 WL 94848 (9th Cir. Mar. 6,
1996) (en banc).
89. See Sylvia A. Law, Silent No More: Physicians' Legal and Ethical Obligations to Patients
Seeking Abortions, 21 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 279, 285-88 (1995).
90. For my discussion of these issues in the abortion context, see generally id.
91. See supra note 5.
92. See supra notes 5, 11.
93. See Daniel Avila, Medical Treatment Rights of Older Persons and Persons with Disabilities:
1993-94 Developments, 10 IssuEs L. & MED. 385 (1995).
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known prior to the onset of a debilitating condition such as
Alzheimer's disease.9 4
The law has confronted similar problems in relation to the sterilization of people with mental disabilities.9 5 On the one hand, the risks
of abuse are enormous; on the other hand, some people with mental
disabilities might honestly see sterilization as in their best interests, if
able to evaluate and express those interests.9 6 However, in the sterilization context no one suggests that competent people must be denied
this choice because of the difficulty of determining whether and when
people with mental disabilities may be sterilized. Protection of those
with mental disabilities presents a weak justification for denying the
autonomy and choice of competent people.
2. Best Interests, Individualand Social.-Defenders of the ban also
argue that even when terminally ill individuals authentically choose to
hasten death, it is not necessarily in their best interests, or in the more
general interests of society, to allow them to act on that choice. The
classic argument against suicide is that it violates the duty that a citizen owes to the community." This argument has power in the case of
healthy young people who are temporarily depressed. Many people
have life experiences that make it seem that life is not worth living.
Others believe that they have been done a wrong so painful that only
self destruction will generate bad feeling sufficient to punish the person who has hurt them. Most people do not act on these self-destructive impulses and live to enjoy life. These experiences generate a
perfectly legitimate paternalistic instinct that urges others to weather
emotional crises.
94. John W. Dalbey Donahue, Physician-Assisted Suicide: A 'Right' Reserved for Only the
Competent?, 19 VT. L. REv. 795 (1995).
95. See, e.g., In re Hayes, 608 P.2d 635, 641-42 (Wash. 1980) (en banc) (denying
mother's petition to have mentally retarded daughter sterilized); In re Moe, 432 N.E.2d 712
(Mass. 1982) (holding that the state court has authority to grant mother's request to sterilize mentally retarded daughter); In re C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607, 613 (Alaska 1981) (holding
that the state court has authority to grant parents' petition to sterilize 19-year-old daughter

with Down's Syndrome).
96. The California Supreme Court, over a powerful dissent by ChiefJustice Rose Bird,
held that a law prohibiting the sterilization of persons under conservatorship infringed the
constitutional rights of developmentally disabled people seeking sterilization. In re Valerie
N., 707 P.2d 760, 771-72 (Cal. 1985).
97. See ThomasJ. Marzen et. al., Suicide, A ConstitutionalRight ?, 24 DuQ. L. Rav. 1, 20-50
(1985). Opponents of suicide from Plato and Aristotle, to Aquinas and Rousseau have
argued that suicide violates the duty the citizen owes to the state. Id. John Locke argued
that human life is the property not of the person living that life, but of God. Id. at 41-44.
Suicide is thus a kind of theft or embezzlement. Euthanasia, like abortion, can be seen as
an insult to God's gift of life. See DwoRKIN, supra note 21, at 195.
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Some defenders of the ban on physician-assisted dying for the
terminally ill, including Judge Noonan for the Ninth Circuit, argue
that the ban is necessary to discourage suicide among those who are
not ill.9" Judge Noonan has asserted that it is impossible to distinguish Dr. Roe from "the depressed 21 year old, the romantically-devastated 28 year old, the alcoholic 40 year old who choose suicide."9 9
This "slippery slope" argument underestimates the law's capacity to
distinguish cases. The depressed twenty-year-old or alcoholic fortyyear-old needs no assistance and is not constrained by legal prohibition. 100 The argument illogically suggests that people in emotional
pain will relate their situation to that of someone close to death. It
seems unlikely that these emotionally distraught individuals are thinking about people in Dr. Roe's situation, or extracting some sort of
justification for their suicide, or even for suicide in general. The concerns are tenuous and speculative.
Defenders of the ban also argue that, even if some terminally ill
patients authentically choose death, the legal ban on physician-assisted dying must be preserved to protect the integrity of the medical
profession.'
The first reason thatJudge Noonan offered in support
of Washington's ban is "[t]he interest in not having physicians in the
role of killers of their patients." 0 2 Judge Noonan observed:
"Physician-assisted suicide is fundamentally incompatible
with the physician's role as healer," [according to] the American Medical Association's Code of Medical Ethics. From the
Hippocratic Oath with its promise "to do no harm," to the
AMA's code, the ethics of the medical profession have proscribed killing.... Not only would the self-understanding of
physicians be affected by removal of the state's support for
their professional stance; the physician's constant search for
ways to combat disease would be affected, if killing were as
acceptable an option for the physician as curing. The physician's commitment to curing is 0the
medical profession's
3
commitment to medical progress.1
Certainly the views of organized medicine deserve a measure of
respect. At the same time, many doctors do not see physician-assisted
98. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 590-91 (9th Cir.), reh'g granteden
bane, 62 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 1995), revd No. 94-35534, 1996 WL 94848 (9th Cir. Mar. 6,
1996) (en banc).
99. Id.
100. See supra text accompanying note 53.
101. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 592.
102. Id.
103. Id. (citations omitted).
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dying as "killing," and thereby inconsistent with a commitment to curing and caring."t 4 Rather, they believe that it is better to accept that
in some cases cure is impossible, and that caring requires respect for
the patient's desire to hasten death. 0 5 The core principle of the doctrine of informed patient consent, recognized as constitutionally
grounded in Cruzan, is that patients are entitled to
disagree with dom10 6
inant medical opinion about their best interests.
Strong constitutional deference to the views of organized
medicine disregards the teachings of history. The American Medical
Association was the principle supporter of the nineteenth-century laws
criminalizing abortion. 10 7 Furthermore, organized medicine sought
the abortion ban primarily to further parochial, self-serving interests
in consolidating control over healing, despite the devastating costs to
pregnant women.' 08
While few doctors actively oppose organized medicine's resistance to physician-assisted dying, the significance of this relative silence
is unclear. As a practical matter it is very easy for a doctor to hasten
the death of the terminally ill patient who wishes to die. As we have
seen, the practice indeed may be both long-standing and common.'0 9
Most doctors engaging in physician-assisted dying have no reason
either to publicize their actions or to challenge the formal legal and
professional ban on physician-assisted dying. 1 0 Indeed, responsible
doctors who help patients to hasten death have enormous disincentives against openly challenging the formal rule.'11 Those who receive
public attention by openly challenging the ban often have not acted
in accordance with the protective standards of Compassion in Dying
or the Oregon Death with Dignity statute.1 12 These considerations
caution skepticism about the depth of organized medicine's opposi104. A majority of doctors believe that the law should not prohibit physician-assisted
dying and the choice to hasten death is sometimes legitimate, freely chosen, and in the
patient's best interest. SeeJonathan S. Cohen et al., Attitudes Toward Assisted Suicide and
EuthanasiaAmong Physicians in Washington State, 331 NEw ENG. J. MED. 89 (1994).

105. See Quill et al., supra note 23, at 1381-82.
106. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 277 (1990).
107.

JAMES C. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA:

THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL

POLICY 1800-1900 passim (1978).

108. See Brief of American Historians as Amici Curiae in Support of Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania at 11, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct.
2791 (1992) (Nos. 91-744 & 91-902).
109. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
110. See Quill et al., supra note 23, at 1381.
111. These disincentives include fear of detection and prosecution. Id.
112. See, e.g., Son's Story Prompts Examination of Death, supra note 10, at 16A (relating the

story of William Meyer); supra note 72 and accompanying text (discussing the controversy
over the actions of Dr. Jack Kevorkian).
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tion to physician-assisted dying and the weight that it should be
afforded.
Defenders of the ban on physician-assisted dying express concern
about the poor and vulnerable."' John H. Pickering, senior counsel
to the firm of Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, and former senior advisor
to the American Bar Association's Commission on Legal Problems of
the Elderly, recently offered a ringing defense of state bans on physician-assisted dying, relying principally on the need to protect "the
most vulnerable segments of our society-the elderly, the poor and
the persons with disabilities."" 4 Quite curiously, however, he concludes, "At the same time I selfishly reserve my right to do in private
what my family, my doctor and pastor and I, in loving consultation,
voluntarily agree is best." 1 5 While his candor is refreshing, it may be
wiser to enact legal principles that are applicable to all. Formal rules,
justified to protect the vulnerable and then ignored by the powerful,
are apt to be unfair to all, and most especially to those they purport to
protect.
3. Sanctity of Life.-Finally, many believe that suicide is intrinsically wrong, even if it is authentically sought by the individual and
does not demonstrably violate the best interests of the individual or
society." 6 In Cruzan, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia embrace the view that the state may limit individuals' right to reject necessary medical care, even if the state thereby undermines individuals'
autonomy and best interests, in order to protect human life itself." 7
The distinction between the intrinsic value of life and its personal
value for the individual explains why many believe that assisted dying
is wrong in all circumstances.
Religious groups stand on both sides of the physician-assisteddeath debate. As a practical matter, the Roman Catholic Church is
the major source of leadership and financial resources opposing the
113. TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 100: Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586,
592 (9th Cir.), reh'g granted en banc, 62 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd, No. 94-35534, 1996
WL 94848 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 1996) (en banc).
114. John H. Pickering, The ContinuingDebate Over Active Euthanasi 3 A.B.A BIOETHICS
BULL. 1, 15 (1994).
115. Id.
116. See DWORKIN, supra note 21, at 195.

117. See supra note 43; Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 299-300
(1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia noted that many states have adopted the view
that a person's decision to commit suicide is none of the state's business. I&at 300. "This
is a view that some societies have held, and that our States are free to adopt if they wish.
But it is not a view imposed by our constitutional traditions, in which the power of the State
to prohibit suicide is unquestionable." Id.
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legalization of physician-assisted dying.11 Many Jewish groups and
many Protestant groups also oppose assisted death." 9 Judaism, however, also recognizes that "to prolong life is a mitzvah [or commandment from God], [but] to prolong dying is not."12 Unitarian
Universalists and the United Church of Christ are at the forefront of
religious support for physician-assisted dying.' 2 1 The Presbyterian
Book of Common Worship includes a set of prayers to be said when a
life-support system is withdrawn. They begin "God of compassion and
love, you have breathed into us the breath of life and have given us
1 22
the exercise of our minds and wills.
Casey dramatically underscores that the state may not justify a denial of individual liberty by adopting one view of a contested moral
issue. 123 The fact that suicide and attempted suicide are no longer
legally prohibited 124 suggests that the basis of the opposition to physi118. Solomon, supra note 9, at 59. The challenge to Oregon's referendum was mounted
by an anti-abortion organization supported by the Catholic Church. Id. The Catholic
Church sees assisted suicide, abortion, and contraception as categorically wrong in all circumstances. See POPE JOHN PAUL II, THE GOSPEL OF LIFE [EVANGELIUM VITAE) 115-24

(1995) (official English translation of Encyclical Letter given in Rome on March 25, 1995).
119. TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 91.
120. Solomon, supra note 9, at 60.
121. Elisabeth Rosenthal, In Matters of Life and Death, the Dying Take Contro4 N.Y. TIMES,

Aug. 18, 1991, at DI. In 1988 the Unitarian Universalist General Assembly issued a statement supporting "the right of self determination in dying." See THE PARK RIDGE CENTER,
AGTvE EuTHANASIA, RELIGION, AND THE PUBLIC DEBATE 67-68 (Ron Hamel ed., 1991).
In the Ninth Circuit, the groups that filed briefs in support of Compassion in Dying
included: Americans for Death with Dignity; Ten Surviving Family Members; Washington
State Legislators; American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Washington; Northwest Women's Law Center; Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc.; AIDS Action Council; Northwest AIDS Foundation; Seattle AIDS Support Group; Gray Panthers Project Fund;
Older Women's League; Seattle Chapter of the National Organization for Women; American Humanists Association; National Lawyers Guild; Local 6 of Service Employees International Union; Temple De Hirsch Sinai; Unitarian Universalist Association; Seattle Chapter
and the Pacific Northwest District Council of the Japanese American Citizens League.
Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 586-88 (9th Cir), reh'ggranteden ban, 62
F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd, No. 94-35534, 1996 WL 94848 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 1996) (en
banc).
Among the groups that defended the state ban before the Ninth Circuit were: United
States Catholic Conference; American Medical Association; Americans United for Life, on
behalf of certain Washington State Legislators; National Legal Center for the Medically
Dependent and Disabled, Inc.; Washington State Hospital Association; Catholic Health Association of the United States; International Anti-Euthanasia Task Force. Id.
122. Solomon, supra note 9, at 59.
123. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2839 (1992) (Stevens,J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) ("[I]n order to be legitimate, the State's interest must be
secular; consistent with the First Amendment the State may not promote a theological or
sectarian interest.").
124. TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 55.
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cian-assisted dying rests upon practical, paternalistic concerns, rather
than moral ones.
As Justice Stevens explained in Cruzan, "Choices about death
touch the core of liberty. Our duty, and concomitant freedom, to
come to terms with the conditions of our own mortality... are essential incidents of the unalienable rights to life and liberty endowed us
by our Creator."

1 25

In sum, the question of whether a state ban on physician-assisted
death violates the rights of Dr. Roe and others in her situation
presents a close constitutional question. Her claims of liberty and privacy are strong. The secular, practical, and paternalistic justifications
offered by the state could be served as well, and probably better,
through more precisely drafted protections. The state's moral interests in the ultimate value of life cannot be refuted or proven. While
the conclusion is not clear, a judge could reasonably decide that Dr.
Roe's constitutional rights have been violated.
II.

THE JUSTICIABILITY OF CHALLENGES TO STATE POLICIES ALLEGED

TO VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHTS OF SOME,

BUT NOT ALL, OF THOSE TO WHOM THEY APPLY

Claims of constitutional protection for assisted dying, refusal of
medical treatment, or abortion are presented to courts in many ways.
This section considers the justiciability of these claims. It addresses
the question of when courts may or must resolve the conflicts
presented in these situations.
These three human conflicts-abortion, refusal of life-saving
treatment, and physician-assisted dying-come to courts in three contexts. First, claims may be raised in defense to a criminal prosecution
or other affirmative state effort to enforce the law. Second, individuals such as Dr. Roe can seek a declaration that application of general
criminal sanctions is unconstitutional on the particular facts of her
case. Third, a class of individuals can assert that the restrictive law is
unconstitutional, on its face, or as applied to a defined class.
A.

Defense to CriminalProsecution

Defense to criminal prosecution is a necessary, but wholly insufficient, means of vindicating constitutional liberty in each of these con125. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 343 (1990) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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Each of the claimed rights considered involves professional

medical services. Doctors are, quite understandably, rarely willing12 to
7
risk criminal prosecution to vindicate the rights of their patients.
Connecticut's ban on prescription contraceptives for married
people eluded constitutional scrutiny for decades because doctors
were unwilling to risk criminal prosecution in order to raise those
claims.' 2 8 For the doctor, the risk is not simply the criminal prosecution, but also public and professional sanction.1 29 Griswold v. Connecticut 130 recognized that defense to a criminal prosecution does not
provide an effective means of vindicating constitutional claims of
13 1
rights in these situations.
B. Affirmative Individual Claims
A second method of raising these claims is through individual
petitions seeking orders that the application of the general criminal
prohibition on murder, assisted suicide, or abortion would be unconstitutional on the facts of each case. Cases involving patients who seek
to terminate medical treatment have, for the most part, arisen this
way. 13 2 In those cases, a patient (or the patient's guardian) seeks to
126. Quill v. Koppell, 870 F. Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). The court rejected the state's
argument that a challenge to a ban on physician-assisted death may only be raised in the
context of a defense to a criminal prosecution. Id. at 81. Some constitutional challenges
to bans on assisted death have been raised in the context of defense to a criminal prosecution. In Hobbins v. Attorney Gen., 518 N.W.2d 487 (Mich. Ct. App.), affd in part and rev'd
in part sub nom. People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994), cert. denied sub noma.

Hobbins v. Kelley, 115 S. Ct. 1795 (1995), the court reviewed three consolidated prosecutions of Dr. Jack Kevorkian. Id. at 487. The Michigan Court of Appeals invalidated a statute criminalizing assisted suicide on state constitutional grounds, but rejected a federal
due process challenge, holding that there is no constitutional right to commit suicide. Id.
at 489-94. On appeal, a divided court rejected state and federal constitutional objections
to Michigan's assisted suicide statutes and remanded the murder prosecutions against
Kevorkian for further proceeding under a new state statutory standard. Kevorkian, 527
N.W.2d at 739-40.
127. See Quill et al., supra note 23, at 1381.
128. DAVID GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALrY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF
Roe v. Wade, chs. 1-3 (1993); see also Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 501 (1961) (citing only
one prosecution for violation of the statute in 75 years).
129. See Quill et al., supra note 23, at 1381.
130. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
131. Id. at 481.

132. See, e.g., Tune v. Walter Reed Army Med. Hosp., 602 F. Supp. 1452 (D.D.C. 1985)
(granting a competent adult the right to have life-support systems removed); Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977) (allowing a patient to refuse medical treatment); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.) (giving a father
decision-making authority over termination of life support), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922
(1976); In re Meyers, 610 N.E.2d 663 (Ohio 1993) (allowing cessation of life-sustaining
treatment; see also Note, Physician-Assisted Suicide and the Right to Die with Assistance, 105
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terminate treatment, and the doctor, hospital, or family member disagrees. Alternatively, in some cases, no one opposes the termination
of treatment, but judicial approval is sought for the action proposed. 133 Courts generally decide these cases as issues of common-law
guardianship, 3 4 or constitutional law. 135 While the state courts have
applied diverse standards for determining when treatment can be terminated, almost all have provided strong respect for individual
choice.'

36

HARv. L. REv. 2021 (1992) (asserting that the constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide should develop in the context of individual claims requestingjudicial authorization of
physician-assisted suicide).
133. See, e.g., In re Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. 1991).
134. See, e.g., Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 417. Many state courts have rested their decisions
on common-law or statutory grounds, e.g. In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 296-97
(Ill. 1989), or have just assumed that there is a constitutional right without specifically
deciding the issue, e.g., Severns v. Wilmington Medical Ctr., Inc., 421 A.2d 1334 (Del.
1980). At least one state supreme court has declined to rule on the constitutional questions because of a lack of state action. In re Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d at 41-42 n.8 ("The
existence of the statute [establishing substitute decisionmakers for incompetents] does not
convert family decisions into state action within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and thus the due process clause does not apply to them.").
135. See, e.g., Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 662-64. At least eight other state supreme courts have
decided the issue of removing life-support systems on the basis of constitutional rights or
liberty interests. See Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 681-82 (Ariz. 1987) (basing the
decision on a right to privacy); In re Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 9-12 (Fla. 1990) (same); Satz v.
Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980) (recognizing a constitutional privacy right to discontinue extraordinary medical treatment, but limiting the holding to the particular facts of
the case); In re L.H.R., 321 S.E.2d 716, 722 (Ga. 1984) (basing the decision on a right to
privacy); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 633 (Mass. 1986)
(same); In re Spring, 405 N.E.2d 115, 119 (Mass. 1980) (recognizing that preventing "unwanted infringements of bodily integrity" is encompassed in the constitutional right to
privacy); In reTorres, 357 N.W.2d 332, 339-40 (Minn. 1984) (basing the decision on a right
to privacy); McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 622 (Nev. 1990) (finding liberty interest
implicated in requests to discontinue life-sustaining medical treatment); In re Colyer, 660
P.2d 738, 742 (Wash. 1983) (basing the decision on a right to privacy); In re L.W., 482
N.W.2d 60, 66-67 (Wis. 1992) (deciding that the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment is constitutionally protected).
136. New York and Missouri are the exceptions. New York law does not permit the
withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining treatment from an incapacitated adult patient
who has neither created a health care proxy nor left written or oral treatment instructions
presenting clear and convincing evidence of a desire to refuse treatment. In re Storar, 420
N.E.2d 64, 73-74 (N.Y.), ceri. denied, 454 U.S. 458 (1981). In Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't
of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990), the Supreme Court held that Missouri's requirement for
clear and convincing evidence of an incapacitated patient's wish to forgo life-sustaining
treatment does not violate the patient's constitutional rights. Only New York and Missouri
condition withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining treatment on clear and convincing
evidence of the patient's wishes. TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 53. In Mack v. Mack, 618
A.2d 744 (Md. 1993), the Maryland Court of Appeals held that life-sustaining treatment
could not be withdrawn or withheld from an incapacitated patient absent clear and convincing evidence of the patient's wishes. Id. at 759. Almost immediately, the Maryland
legislature enacted the Health Care Decisions Act, which authorizes family members and
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Significant benefits arise from adjudicating constitutional claims
in the context of the concrete facts of a particular case. The whole law
ofjusticiability, and indeed the common-law method of decision-making, reflect, among other things, the understanding that legal principles are apt to be developed more wisely in richly contextualized and
concrete disputes.'

37

Dr. Jane Roe plainly had standing to challenge Washington's ban
on physician-assisted death. Traditional requirements demand that
she allege that she "personally has suffered some actual or threatened
injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant, ....
that the injury 'fairly can be traced to the challenged action' and [that
the injury] 'is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.""31 8 Dr.
Roe met all of these requirements. She was dying and sought to control that process. Her doctor was willing to help her, but was deterred
by the threat of criminal prosecution. The court could provide an
effective remedy by holding that it would be unconstitutional to apply
the criminal ban on assisted suicide to Dr. Roe or Dr. Roe's physician.
Dr. Roe did not raise "'abstract questions of wide public significance'
which amount to 'generalized grievances,' pervasively shared.""3 9 Her
claim did not rest on "the legal rights or interests of third parties"
40
rather than on her own.'
By the time the federal district court decided her claim, she failed
to meet traditional standing requirements in one respect. She died
other interested individuals, in a listed order of priority, to act as surrogate decisionmakers
for incapacitated patients who have not executed advance directives. MD. CODE ANN.,
HEALTH-GEN. §§ 5-601 to -618 (Supp. 1993).
137. TIBE, supra note 14, at 67-134. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group,
Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978) provides a dramatic example of the dangers that arise when the
Court relaxes requirements ofjusticiability and decides cases in a hypothetical form. Plaintiffs in Duke Power challenged the constitutionality of the federal Price-Anderson Act, 42
U.S.CA § 2210 (1994), which placed sharp limits on the right to pursue state tort claims
for injuries resulting from accidents at nuclear power plants. The Court relaxed traditional requirements of standing and ripeness to allow plaintiffs to sue. Duke Power, 438 U.S.
at 80-81. Relying on the defendant's assertion that the risk of such accidents was "extremely remote," the Court affirmed the federal limits on liability. Id. at 86-93. Nine
months later, the accident at Three-Mile Island proved the defendant's assertions wrong.
In re TMI Litigation Cases Consolidated I, 940 F.2d 832, 836 (3d Cir. 1991). Subsequent
interpretations of the federal limits on liability for accidents in nuclear power plants have
largely eviscerated Duke Powers hasty decision on the merits of plaintiffs' claim. See, e.g.,
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
138. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church &
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (quoting Gladstone v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S.
91, 99 (1979); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 41 (1976)); see also
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (citing the Valley Forge standing requirements).
139. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 475 (citations omitted).
140. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).
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while the case was pending and the state could thus argue that her
claim was moot.14 1 Despite the mootness concern, traditional concepts of standing and justiciability allow plaintiffs to continue to litigate where: "(1) the challenged action [is] in its duration too short to
be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there [is]
a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party [will] be
subject to the same action again."1 4 2 In Roe v. Wade'4 3 the Supreme
Court held that, although the named plaintiffs were no longer pregnant, the case was not moot because "[p] regnancy often comes more
than once to the same woman" and hence was a classic case in which
an issue was "capable of repetition, yet evading review. "144 Dr. Roe
cannot assert that she might be subject to the same action again. 4 5
The mootness problem can be avoided in two ways, however. First,
plaintiffs' attorneys can add new named plaintiffs when the initial
named plaintiffs die during the course of litigation. Second, if named
plaintiffs' claims are live at the point the case is filed, the court may
certify a class of similarly situated individuals.' 46 In any case, it seems
wrong to avoid deciding the claims of dying patients solely because
the plaintiff died while the courts considered claims that were live and
1 47
legitimate when presented.

141. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1456 n.2 (W.D. Wash.
1994), rev'd, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir.), reh'ggranted en bane, 62 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd,
No. 94-35534, 1996 WL 94848 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 1996) (en banc).
142. Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975) (per curiam) (holding that inmate's suit against parole board decision was moot because inmate had since been released
and there was "no demonstrated probability" that the inmate would ever come before the
board again).
143. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
144. Id. at 125.
145. A good example of the application of the future-individual-impact requirement is
found in DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974). Plaintiff, an unsuccessful applicant to
the University of Washington Law School, challenged the school's admission policies. During the litigation, the applicant was admitted, and by the time the Supreme Court heard
the case, was in his final semester of law school. Id. at 314-15. Because his suit was not cast
as a class action and the only requested relief was injunctive, the Court held that his case
was moot. Id. at 317-20; see also Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 318 n.6 (1988) (holding that
plaintiff must show a "reasonable expectation" of future impact, not a "demonstrated
probability").
146. Cf DeFunis,416 U.S. at 317. Mr. DeFunis could not seek class certification because
the class of people denied admission to law school was very large-much larger than the
total number of students admitted to the school in any year. Because he sought personal
relief, relief to the entire class of which he was a part would not provide him a practical
benefit.
147. In all these cases-right to refuse treatment, abortion, and right to physician-assisted suicide-courts have uniformly rejected moomess claims.
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C.

Affirmative Class Claims

While there are real benefits in deciding difficult issues in the
context of a concrete individual case, individual determinations often
impose undue burdens on both individual rights and the judiciary.
The choice between individual and general remedies appears influenced by two factors. First, if there is a need for a speedy decision, the
judicial process is probably inadequate in individual case-by-case determinations. Second, if there are large numbers of cases, courts have
powerful and legitimate reasons to delegate final decision-making
authority.
In the cases involving the right to refuse medical treatment,
courts have not limited remedies to the adjudication of individual
claims. For example, In re Quinlanwas litigated as a claim about withdrawing life support from an individual patient. 148 After determining
the principles and processes that should be used to decide when treatment could be terminated, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated that
"a practice of applying to a court to confirm such decisions would
generally be inappropriate, not only because that would be a gratuitous encroachment upon the medical profession's field of competence, but because it would be impossibly cumbersome."' 4 9
In Massachusetts, the Supreme Judicial Court initially suggested
that decisions to discontinue or deny treatment to incompetent people ordinarily should be reviewed by the courts.' 50 This aspect of the
Massachusetts decision was sharply criticized,' 5 ' and the Massachusetts
court subsequently ruled that there was no requirement of prior judicial review in refusal of treatment cases.'- 2 In sum, the courts have
determined that it is not appropriate to adjudicate common-law and
148. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (NJ. 1976).
149. Id. at 669.
150. In Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass.
1977), the court stated that
questions of life and death seem to us to require the process of detached but
passionate investigation and decision that forms the ideal on which the judicial
branch of government was created. Achieving this ideal is our responsibility and
that of the lower court, and is not to be entrusted to any other group purporting
to represent the "morality and conscience of our society," no matter how highly
motivated or impressively constituted.
Id. at 435.
151. See William J. Curran, Law Medicine Notes: The Saikewicz Decision, 298 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 499, 500 (1978) (criticizing the procedure advanced in Saikewicz); Arnold S. Relman,
The Saikewicz Decision: Judges and Physicians, 298 NEw ENG.J. MED. 508 (1978) (noting the
"immediate disruptive consequences of the Saikewicz ruling").
152. In re Spring, 405 N.E.2d 115 (Mass. 1980).
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constitutional refusal of treatment claims solely in the context of individual cases.
Sole reliance on individual claims to vindicate constitutional
rights is even less appropriate in the context of abortion than in the
context of decisions to terminate necessary medical treatment. Typically, people seeking to terminate necessary medical treatment may be
maintained on life-support systems for a long period of time, allowing
full adjudication of individual claims. By contrast, pregnancy lasts
only nine months. The period in which abortion is a realistic option
is much shorter, and the risks and costs of abortion increase dramatically with each passing week.15 3 Furthermore, thousands of women
seek abortions for every individual who seeks to terminate life-sustaining medical treatment. 1 54 If courts have concluded that it is unrealistically cumbersome to demand judicial review of individual
decisions to reject essential medical treatment, then, a fortiori, such
an individualized approach is inappropriate in the context of
155
abortion.
In claims of right to assisted death, as in abortion cases, the time
factor is more pressing than it is for patients refusing necessary medical life support. As in the abortion context, a competent, terminally
ill patient's claim of right to hasten death will, by definition, quickly
become moot. The Ninth Circuit panel that initially considered Com153. The Center for Disease Control reported that the risks of complications from abortion increase 20% for each week abortion is delayed, and that the death risk increases 50%

for each week of delay. These statistics were discussed in McRae v. Califano, 491 F. Supp.
630, 656 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd sub nom. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (holding that
exclusion of medically necessary abortions from the otherwise comprehensive Medicaid
program does not violate equal protection).
154. In 1992, 1,529,000 abortions were performed in the United States. ECONOMICs &
STATIsTICs ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATIs-rICAL ABSTRACTS OF THE UNITED STATES
1994, tbl. 111, Abortions-Number, Rate, and Ratio, by Race: 1975 to 1992, (Bureau of the

Census, 114th ed. 1994). The most widely accepted figures for the number of patients in a
persistent vegetative state come from a report of the 1982 Presidential Commission for the
Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine. The report estimates that there are 5000 to 10,000
such patients. Brian McCormick, 4 AM. MED. NEWS 23 n.1 (Jan. 7, 1991).
155. In one subset of cases, the Supreme Court has approved state laws demanding individual judicial determinations for women seeking an abortion. The Court has upheld requirements that minors notify their parents, but only where the statute provides an
opportunity for a prompt judicial determination that the minor is sufficiently mature to
consent for herself, without parental consultation, or that parental notification would not
be in her best interest. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990); Ohio v. Akron Ctr.
for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990). The dissenting opinions in these cases document
the harms that the requirement of individual judicial determinations impose on minors
and the burdens that it imposes on the courts. Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 497-501 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Healh, 497 U.S. at 526-29
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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passion in Dying noted that all of the named patients challenging the
Washington law had died-without physician assistance-while the
case was being litigated. 5 ' The panel inconsistently suggested that
the claim is, therefore, moot and nonjusticiable, while also holding
15 7
that no right of the now-deceased patients was violated.
It is less clear how the number of terminally ill individuals seeking the right to choose physician-assisted dying compares to the
number of those seeking abortion or termination of necessary medical life support."5 ' In evaluating whether individual remedies are an
adequate and preferable alternative to class relief, numbers matter.
At first blush it seems that the number of women seeking abortion
must be vastly greater than the number of individuals seeking the
right to choose physician-assisted dying." 9 But, if we account for the
liberty and autonomy claims of those who reject assisted suicide, as well
as those who seek it,' the class of individuals affected by the ban on
assisted suicide is very large. Indeed, the class of people affected by
physician-assisted suicide laws might include everyone, except those
who die without any prior notice and those who have no physicians.
Similarly the availability of abortion directly impacts all women of
child-bearing age, and not too indirectly impacts all women. Certainly, the number of people who seek the right to reject essential
medical treatment is smaller than the number seeking either abortion
or physician-assisted death. If individual judicial determination is unduly cumbersome and necessitates class remedies in the refusal of
treatment cases, then, a fortiori, class remedies are essential to vindicate rights to choose abortion or physician-assisted death.
In sum, conflicts between individual claims of liberty and privacy,
and state concerns cannot be resolved practically in the framework of
individual disputes. In each context the disputes must be addressed at
156. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 588-89 (9th Cir.), reh'g granted en
banc, 62 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd, No. 94-35534, 1996 WL 94848 (9th Cir. Mar. 6,
1996) (en banc).
157. Id. at 593; see also supra notes 45, 137.
158. While it is difficult to predict how many people might seek physician-assisted death,
one can deduce that the numbers are not insignificant. In 1991 approximately 123,000
people over the age of 75 committed suicide (the suicide rate in this group was 47.5 per
100,000 population). ECONOMICS & STATISTICS ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTI.
CAL ABSTRACTS OF THE UNITED STATES 1994, tbl. 136, Suicide Rates, &y Sex, Race, and Age
Group: 1980 to 1991 (Bureau of the Census, 114th ed., 1994). The elderly have the highest
suicide rates of all Americans. Patrick J. Meehan et al., Suicides Among Older United States
Residents: Epidemiologic Characteristicsand Trends, 81 AM.J. PUB. HEALTH 1196, 1198 (1991).
159. Compare supra notes 154 (abortion statistics) and 158 (suicide statistics).
160. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
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a higher level of abstraction by considering the remedial principles
and processes applicable to classes of affected individuals.
III.

DEVISING JUDICIAL REMEDIES FOR LAWS THAT VIOLATE THE

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF SOME, BUT NOT ALL, OF THOSE

TO WHOM THEY APPLY

Courts often confront the problem of determining the appropriate remedy when a state policy violates the constitutional rights of
some, but not all, of the people affected. While the problem is common, the principles for resolving it are remarkably unclear, indeed,
often incoherent.16 Two important values clash. On the one hand,
courts must provide an effective remedy for all individuals whose con-

stitutional rights are jeopardized by state law. On the other hand,
courts should, to the extent feasible, respect and support democratic
choice and state discretion.
Courts have used many strategies to resolve these remedial conflicts. The narrowest principle is to reject the substantive constitutional challenge unless the law is invalid in every conceivable
circumstance. As I argue below, this "principle" is wrong and inconsis161. See Barry Freidman, When Rights Encounter Reality: Enforcing Federal Remedies, 65 S.
CAL. L. REv. 735 (1992).
Without an available and enforceable remedy, a right may be nothing more than
a nice idea. Any meaningful discussion of rights, therefore, must focus on remedies available to implement the rights.
This realist insight is particularly potent, and yet often neglected, in the area
of constitutional law. Constitutional rights are the subject of a vibrant scholarly
and popular debate, alongside which the writings on constitutional remedies are
noticeably sparse.
Id. at 735-36. The discussion that does exist focuses largely on the difficult problems that

arise when the Constitution demands large organizational change from reluctant defendants. For a summary of the literature on constitutional remedies, see id. at 736 n.4. While
organizational upheaval is an important problem, it is not the only one and is not addressed in this Article.
The literature most closely related to the issues addressed here considers whether a
party to whom a law may constitutionally be applied may argue that the law is unconstitutional on its face because it would be impermissible to apply it to others. See, e.g., Michael
C. Doff, FacialChallenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STA,. L. REV. 235 (1994); Henry P.
Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 Sup. CT. RE-v. 1; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853 (1991); Note, First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L.
RE%,. 844 (1970). The challenge of devising appropriate remedies, however, is not limited
to the situation in which parties concede that their conduct could be prohibited constitutionally under more precisely drawn laws. Even when the challenged law is unconstitu-

tional as applied to the named plaintiffs or defendants, courts must consider what form of
remedy is appropriate.
My colleagues at a NYU Brown Bag Workshop initially challenged my assertion that
there was no scholarly discussion of the precise question addressed in this section. How-

ever, after a search of their minds and the literature, no one could find such a discussion.
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tent with the whole of our constitutional tradition. 16 2 A second narrow principle would provide relief only if a substantial proportion of
those affected by the law are denied constitutional liberty. While this
approach is sometimes defensible in cases in which laws are challenged by parties to whom they may be constitutionally applied, it is
not defensible in cases in which the parties establish that the state has
violated their constitutionally protected right. 163 Three other remedial approaches have been widely and legitimately used: provide relief only to named plaintiffs; strike the law as unconstitutional and
allow the legislature to fashion a new approach to the problem; and
fashion an order that defines and prohibits unconstitutional enforcement of the law while allowing other applications.
A.

The Salerno Rule: The Stealth Destruction of ConstitutionalLiberty

In March 1986 Anthony Salerno and Vincent Cafaro were arrested and charged in a twenty-nine-count indictment alleging various
violations in connection with their work with the Genovese crime family, La Cosa Nostra. 6 At their arraignment, the government asked to
have them detained pursuant to a provision of the Bail Reform Act of
.1984165 that allows accused people to be detained if "no condition or
combination of conditions will reasonably assure.., the safety of any
other person and the community."' 6 6 They were detained and filed
suit challenging the constitutionality of the Act under the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Excessive Bail Clause of the
Eighth Amendment.' 6 7 In October, Cafaro became a cooperating wit68
ness and was released to do covert work for the federal government.
In November, while the case was pending before the Supreme Court,
Salerno was convicted on unrelated charges and sentenced to 100
years imprisonment.' 6 9 These developments suggested that the defendants lacked standing to challenge the preventive detention provisions of the Bail Reform Act; Salerno was in jail for the rest of his life
and Cafaro was on the street working for the government.1 70 None162. See infra notes 172-201 and accompanying text.
163. See infra notes 202-222 and accompanying text.

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 743 (1987).
18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3156 (1994).
Id. § 3142(e).
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746.
Id. at 757-58 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 756.
Id. at 757-58.
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theless, the Supreme Court considered and rejected Salerno and
Cafaro's challenge to the Bail Reform Act. 17 '
United States v. Salerno asserts that a statute may not be held unconstitutional on its face unless challengers demonstrate that "no set
of circumstances exists under which the [law] would be valid. " 17 2 On
the facts of the case, this language is at least dicta-a passing comment not essential to the decision of the case. The Court had at least
two narrower grounds on which it could have dismissed Salerno and
Cafaro's claim. First, it could have held, as the dissenters urged, that
their claim was moot.' 73 Second, it could have held that, as applied to
Salerno and Cafaro, the law was constitutional and left open the possibility that the constitutionality of the law could be challenged in a
subsequent case. Rather, the Court used this occasion of a moot
claim, by defendants to whom the law legitimately could be applied, to
announce a broad new rule of constitutional right and remedy. The
Salerno holding is more accurately characterized as the Court speaking
as "roving commissions assigned to pass judgment on the validity of
the Nation's laws."' 7 4 The Court reached out to declare a rule that
was in no way essential to the decision of the case. The Court offered
no precedent, authority, or reasoning to support this extraordinary
proposition. The Salerno rule simply restates the rule, traditionally applied to constitutional challenges to state economic legislation, that a
law must be upheld if any state of facts can be imagined in which it
would be constitutional. 75 Typically, however, when the Court holds
a statute unconstitutional, it is possible to imagine circumstances in
which the rule might be validly and constitutionally applied. 76 Sa171. Id. at 745-55. Justices Marshall and Brennan, dissenting, argued that the claim was
moot and that the Bail Act was unconstitutional. Id. at 755-67. For an application of the
Salerno rule, see Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994), which held, in the alternative, that the plaintiff lacked standing to challenge military rules penalizing homosexuals,
that the rules are constitutional, and that, under Salerno, the rules must be upheld because
there are circumstances under which they could be constitutionally applied. Id. at 697.
Judge Ginsburg, concurring and dissenting, would have held that if the plaintiff lacks
standing the court should not consider the claim. Id. at 700-01 (Ginsburg, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
172. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745.
173. Id. at 756 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
174. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610-11 (1973) (holding that a state statute
regulating certain political activities of state employees was not substantially overbroad or

vague).
175. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745.
176. For example, in Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), the
Court struck down the poll tax as facially unconstitutional, without asking whether it might
fairly be applied to a wealthy person, or even whether Mr. Harper was rich or poor. Id. at
666-67. In Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978), the Court struck the statute prohibiting marriage licenses for people with outstanding child support obligations, without in-
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lerno extends the substantive rule of deference to state discretion to
regulate economic affairs to cases in which the court has found that
the law burdens a fundamental personal liberty without strong justification. The Salerno rule uses the remedial phase of constitutional adjudication to enshrine substantive constitutional principles wholly
deferential to state power. The Ninth Circuit panel in Compassion in
Dying initially relied on Salerno in reversing the district court's holding
that Washington's ban on assisted suicide was unconstitutional.1 7 7 After rehearing the case en banc, however, the Ninth Circuit reversed
the panel's decision and rejected the Salerno test as being inappropriate for adjudicating the plaintiffs' constitutional challenge to Washington's statute.' 7 8
quiring into the particular circumstances of the named plaintiff and without concluding
that the statute could never be constitutionally applied. Id. at 388-91.
177. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir.), reh'g granted en
ban4 62 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd, No. 94-35534, 1996 WL 94848 (9th Cir. Mar. 6,
1996) (en banc); see also supra note 45 (discussing the Ninth Circuit's en banc decision).
"The district court indeed conceded that there were circumstances in which the statute
could operate constitutionally, for example to deter suicide by teenagers or to prevent
fraud upon the elderly." Id.
178. Compassion in Dying, No. 94-35534, 1996 WL 94848, at *54 n.9. The Ninth Circuit
en banc held that the provision of the Washington statute prohibiting the aiding of another person in attempting suicide was unconstitutional. Id. at *5. This provision, "as
applied to the prescription of life-ending medication for use by terminally ill, competent
adult patients who wish to hasten their deaths, violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. In a foomote, the court further explained:
Declaring a statute unconstitutional as applied to members of a group is atypical but not uncommon. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985)
(holding that state law permitting police officers to use deadly force to prevent
the escape of felony suspects was unconstitutional as applied to suspects who pose
no immediate threat to officers or others); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972) (holding Wisconsin's mandatory attendance law unconstitutional but only
as applied to Amish children who have graduated from eight grade). Although
the Court did not explicitly use the term "as applied," it did explicitly affirm the
judgment of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, id. at 207, which struck down the
statute only as applied to Amish children who had graduated from the eighth
grade. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 182 N.W.2d 539 (Wis. 1971). Because we are not deciding the facial validity of [the Washington statute], there can be no question
that the exacting test for adjudicating claims of facial invalidity announced in
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987), is inapplicable here.... For that
reason alone, we would reject Washington's suggestion that we use the Salerno
test for adjudicating plaintiffs' constitutional challenge. Moreover, not only is
there strong evidence that the Court does not generally apply the Salerno test, see
Michael C. Doff, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 Stan. L. Rev.
235 (1994), but it is clear that it has applied a different test forjudging the constitutionality of statutes restricting a woman's right to secure an abortion. Casey,
112 S. Ct. at 2829-30. Since the claimed liberty issue in this case is in many respects similar to the liberty issue involved in Casey.... we believe that the Salerno
test would not in any event be the appropriate one for adjudicating a facial challenge to Washington's prohibition on assisted suicide.
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No contemporaneous reaction to Salerno recognized this dramatic change in constitutional law. Rather, reaction to the case focused on the substantive holdings on due process and excessive bail
and ignored the Court's articulation of a dramatic new rule of constitutional remedy.

179

Justice Scalia has subsequently affirmed his commitment to the
Salerno rule that a law can be held unconstitutional only if "there exists
no set of circumstances in which the... [law] can constitutionally be
applied." 0 Guam adopted a law that prohibited all abortions except
when two doctors confirm that the pregnancy would endanger the
woman's life or seriously impair her health."' 1 The law was plainly
unconstitutional under both Roe v. Wade"8 2 and Planned Parenthoodv.
Casey,183 and the lower courts so held. 4 The Supreme Court declined review. 8 ' Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice White, dissented, arguing that because the Guam statute could
be constitutionally applied in some circumstances, such as to a woman
seeking an abortion after the fetus was viable, the Salerno rule required
that the statute be upheld against facial challenge. 6 Apart from SaId. at *54 n.9.
179. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1986 Term: Leading Cases, 101 HARv. L. REv. 119, 169-79
(1987) (arguing that Salerno was wrongly decided on the merits). Betsy K. Wanger, Limiting PreventiveDetention Through ConditionalRelease: The Unfulfilled Promise of the 1982 Pretrial
Services Act, 97 YALE LJ. 320 (1987) (discussing the SalernoCourt's finding that the preventive detention sections of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 did not violate either the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment or the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth
Amendment).
180. Ada v. Guam Soc'y of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 113 S. Ct. 633, 633 (1992)
(mem.) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
181. Guam Soc'y of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Ada, 962 F.2d 1366, 1367 (9th Cir.)
(citing Guam Pub. L. No. 20-134 (1990)), withdrawn, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 7599 (9th
Cir.), and amended, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 13, 490 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 633
(1992).
182. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
183. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992); see supra note 13.
184. See Guam Soc'y of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Ada, 776 F. Supp. 1422 (D.
Guam App. Div. 1990), affid, 962 F.2d 1366, 1369 (9th Cir.) ("The district court held that
Roe v. Wade applied, and granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, permanently enjoining enforcement of the Act. We Affirm."), withdrawn, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 7599 (9th
Cir.), and amended, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 13, 490 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 633
(1992).
185. Ada, 113 S. Ct. at 633.
186. Id. at 633-34 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White,
Scalia, and Thomas had opposed the reaffirmance of Roe in Casey. Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2855 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Justice Thomas was the only Casey dissenter who did not join the Ada dissent. Ada,
113 S. Ct. at 633. His failure to join the dissent may have been a tactical maneuver rather
than indicative of his true views. Had he joined the Ada dissent, the Court would have
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lerno itself, the dissenters could offer little authority for this extraordinary rule. i" 7
The Salerno rule has most often been discussed in lower court
decisions considering post-Casey challenges to laws restricting access to
abortion."' 8 In these cases, states argue that legal restrictions on abortion may be held unconstitutional on their face only if "no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid."18 9 The
challengers, on the other hand, argue that, under Casey, an abortion
law is unconstitutional on its face if, "in a large fraction of the cases in
which [the law] is relevant, it will operate as a substantial obstacle to a
woman's choice to undergo an abortion."1 9 ° Only the Fifth Circuit
has applied the Salerno rule in these cases, while the Third and Eighth
Circuits have held that laws must be held invalid on their face if they
are unconstitutional in a large fraction of cases. 1 ' Similarly, a majority of the Supreme Court, while not squarely resolving the issue, has
strongly suggested that a law restricting access to abortion is invalid on
its face if, "in a large fraction of the cases in which [the law] is relevant, it will operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman's choice to
undergo an abortion."' 9 2
The implications of the Salerno rule are breathtaking. Petitioners
in Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. EnvironmentalProtectionAgency' 9 3
challenged government rules that allowed the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to close down a Superfund waste site, without providing notice of the charges or an opportunity to contest the
finding.1 94 The court conceded that "petitioners certainly raise seriheard the case and, presumably, affirmed the lower court decisions striking the Guam law
as unconstitutional.
187. Ada, 113 S. Ct. at 634. Justice Scalia cited Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs.,
492 U.S. 490 (1989), in which Justice O'Connor used Salerno as an alternative basis for
upholding the constitutionality of a state law prohibiting public hospitals from allowing
performance of abortions. Ada, 113 S. Ct. at 634 (citing Webster, 492 U.S. at 524
(O'Connor, J., concurring)). Justice Scalia's citation of O'Connor's opinion in Webster is

questionable on this point. Because she held that the law challenged in Websterviolated no
constitutional right, the principle of Salerno was not necessary to her conclusion.
188. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Miller, 63 F.3d 1452, 1456-58 (8th Cir. 1995); Casey
v. Planned Parenthood, 14 F.3d 848, 863 n.21 (3d Cir. 1994); Barnes v. Moore, 970 F.2d 12,
14 & n.2 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 656 (1992).
189. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).
190. Casey, 112 S. Ct at 2830; see also Miller, 63 F.3d. at 1456-58 (characterizing this
dispute and summarizing cases).
191. See supra note 188.

192. Fargo Women's Health Org. v. Schafer, 113 S. Ct. 1668, 1669 (1993) (O'Connor,
Souter, D., concurring in the denial of a stay pending appeal); see discussion infra text
accompanying note 220.
193. 56 F.3d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
194. Id. at 1434.
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ous-indeed grave-questions as to the adequacy of these procedures."1 95 Nonetheless, the court denied relief.'9 6 Recognizing that
Salerno required that plaintiffs "establish that no set of circumstances
exists under which the Act would be valid,"' 9 7 the Court stated:
We discern at least one scenario where the off-site rule would
be procedurally valid. The rule suffers no procedural infirmities where a facility does not dispute the initial finding of
unacceptability. Under such circumstances, the procedural
safeguards petitioners allege are lacking become unnecesthe facility is not challenging
sary for the simple reason that
98
the finding in any respect.1
This conclusion underscores the absurdity of Salerno. The fact
that some people accept that a state determination adverse to them is
just and reasonable does not deny the legitimacy of the due process
claims of those who believe that the government has made a mistake.
Procedural due process is all about cases in which the government
makes a mistake. The fact that the government sometimes acts fairly
does not obviate the individual's interest in an opportunity to protest
errors. In Goldberg v. Kelly, 199 the record showed that less than two
percent of the welfare recipients whose benefits were terminated requested a hearing to protest. 20 0 The Court nonetheless held that the
Constitution required hearings for those few people who believed that
the state acted in error.20 1
In sum, the Salerno rule represents a radical and unwise departure
from established constitutional law. The government's legitimate reason to restrict or ban suicide in some situations does not answer Dr.
Roe's constitutional claims.

195. Id. at 1437.
196. Id. at 1438.
197. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).
198. Chemical Waste Management, 56 F.3d at 1437.
199. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
200. See Brief for Appellee at 57, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). From January
20, 1969, to May 30, 1969, New York City terminated aid to 60,000 families; just over a
thousand of these people requested a prior hearing available to them under the district
court's injunction. Id. Over half of these persons prevailed in the pretermination hearing.
Id.
201. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 267.
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Refuse Relief Unless the Challenged Law Denies the Constitutional
Rights of Most People It Affects

Bedrock principles of American constitutional and common law
require that courts only decide live controversies. 2 American constitutional law recognizes two important exceptions to this principle.
First, where state policies inflict harms that resolve themselves quickly,
courts do not deny review. State-inflicted harms "capable of repetition yet evading review" are reviewable where challengers presented
live claims when the suit was filed.20 3 Second, and more controversial,
people asserting First Amendment rights can sometimes challenge
laws that broadly deter exercise of those rights.20 4 The First Amendment overbreadth doctrine is an exception to the general rule that
individuals may not litigate the rights of third parties. As the Court
explained,
an individual whose own speech or expressive conduct may
validly be prohibited or sanctioned is permitted to challenge
a statute on its face because it also threatens others not
before the court-those who desire to engage in legally protected expression but who may refrain from doing so rather
than risk prosecution or undertake to have the law declared
partially invalid.20 5
The notion that parties who lack personal standing can enlist a
court to strike a statute as facially unconstitutional is "strong
medicine." 20 6 Broadrick v. Oklahoma limited the rights of parties, not
personally affected by a law, to challenge it as unconstitutional on its
face, by holding that a law may not be struck down as unconstitutional
on its face unless its unconstitutional applications are "not only ...
real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly
legitimate sweep.

2

01

202. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 142-144 and accompanying text.
204. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940) (striking down a statute prohibiting all picketing because it banned peaceful picketing protected by the First Amendment);
Board of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 576 (1987) (unanimously
invalidating a rule proscribing all "First Amendment activities" in an airport terminal). See
generally supra note 161.
205. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 503 (1985) (holding that, because
obscenity is unprotected expression under the First Amendment, a state may enact regulations that outlaw pornographic movie theaters as moral nuisances); see also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432 (1963) (holding that a ban on barratry is invalid because it may
prohibit exercise of First Amendment rights "whether or not. . . the petitioner has engaged in privileged conduct").
206. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973); see supra note 174.
207. 413 U.S. at 615.
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Plaintiffs in Broadrickwere state employees who challenged a law
prohibiting civil servants from engaging in political activity.2" 8 The
Court found that the plaintiffs had not been prevented from engaging
in constitutionally protected activity.2" 9 It rejected their claim that the
law should be held invalid on its face because it was potentially applicable to constitutionally protected activity.2 10 In effect, the Court held
that the plaintiffs were not entitled to raise the claims of third parties,
people who had been disciplined for engaging in constitutionally protected activities, who were not among the named plaintiffs. Similarly,
the Court has refused to strike down trespass, breach of the peace, or
other ordinary criminal laws where the number of instances in which
these laws may be applied to suppress protected expression is small in
comparison to the laws' legitimate targets of unprotected behavior. 1
Reasonable people disagree about whether this principle of "substantial overbreadth" is justifiable where parties do not allege state violation of rights personal to them. On the one hand, some argue that
people have the right to be judged under a constitutionally valid
law.2 2 On the other hand, as the Court has recognized, if the law is
valid as applied to the party in litigation, it should not be held unconcircumstances in
stitutional, even if it is possible to imagine other
2 13
which it could not be applied constitutionally.
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey,214 the Court extended the "substantial overbreadth" requirement to situations in which the actual
parties demonstrated violation of their own rights.21 5 Plaintiffs challenged a law requiring that women seeking abortions listen to a doctor recite a state mandated anti-abortion message twenty-four hours

208.
209.
210.
211.
"near"

Id. at 602.
Id. at 617-18.
Id. at 618.
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) (upholding statute prohibiting picketing
courthouse against First Amendment challenge and describing the law as a "precise,
narrowly drawn" regulation, but holding that prosecution was unconstitutional as applied
to a demonstration that police officials had indicated was permissible).
212. See Monaghan, supra note 161, at 3; see also Dorf, supra note 161, at 238, 245-48.
213. The Supreme Court has long declined to hold laws unconstitutional simply because they are capable of unconstitutional application. Yazoo & M.V.R.R. v.Jackson Vingar
Co., 226 U.S. 217 (1912), is the classic case. The railroad challenged the constitutionality
of a law requiring them to promptly settle all claims for lost or damaged goods. Id. at 217.
It argued that the statute was invalid as applied to fraudulent or frivolous claims, but did
not contest the validity of the claim against it. Id. at 217-19. The Court rejected the facial
challenge, stating, "It suffices ... to hold that, as applied in cases like the present, the
statute is valid." Id. at 219-20.
214. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
215. Id. at 2825-26.
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before receiving an abortion." 6 Plaintiffs demonstrated that the law
imposed a substantial burden on their ability to obtain an abortion,
and was designed and intended to do so.'27 The Court acknowledged
that these findings were "troubling," but concluded that the facts had
not demonstrated "that the waiting period constitutes an undue
21 8
burden."
Where individual parties demonstrate that a state law is unconstitutional as applied to them, it seems wrong to demand that they
demonstrate that the law is unconstitutional as applied to most of
those whom it affects. In Casey, the Court rejected the state's argument that Pennsylvania's highly tailored requirement of spousal notification of a proposed abortion would be constitutional as applied to
ninety-nine percent of the women affected. The Court held that "the
proper focus of constitutional inquiry is the group for whom the law is
a restriction, not the group for whom the law is irrelevant." 2 19 If the
law is unconstitutional as applied to any women affected by it, it is
unconstitutional on its face.
In subsequent cases, the Court has made plain that a law restricting access to abortion must be held unconstitutional on its face if it is
invalid "in a large fraction of the cases" to which it applies. 220 This
approach wisely rejects the Salerno rule. But, at the same time, it
216. Id. at 2803.

217. The Supreme Court accepted the trial court's finding that
because of the distances many women must travel to reach an abortion provider,
the practical effect will often be a delay of more than a day because the waiting
period requires that a woman seeking an abortion make at least two visits to the
doctor. The District Court also found that in many instances this will increase the
exposure of women seeking abortions to "the harassment and hostility of antiabortion protestors demonstrating outside a clinic." . . . [T]he District Court
found that for those women who have the fewest financial resources, those who
must travel long distances, and those who have difficulty explaining their whereabouts to husbands, employers, or others, the 24-hour waiting period will be "particularly burdensome."
Id. at 2825.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 2799.
220. On remand, the Third Circuit held that a provision should be struck as unconstitutional if the "plaintiff show[s] an abortion regulation would be an undue burden 'in a
large fraction of the cases.'" Casey v. Planned Parenthood, 14 F.3d 848, 863 n.21 (3d Cir.),
stay denied, 114 S. Ct. 909 (1994). In denying an application for a stay of the Third Circuit's
mandate, Justice Souter noted that the Third Circuit "Court of Appeals's construction of
the opinion and mandate .. .is the correct one." Casey, 114 S. Ct. at 911. Similarly, in
Fargo Women's Health Org. v. Schafer, 113 S.Ct. 1668, 1669 (1993) (O'Connor, J.,concurring), the Court denied an application for a stay. Justice O'Connor stated that "a law
restricting abortions constitutes an undue burden, and hence is invalid, if, 'in a large fraction of the cases in which [the law] is relevant, it will operate as a substantial obstacle to a
woman's choice to undergo an abortion.'" Id.
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seems wrong to deny individual constitutional rights unless the affected individual can demonstrate that the law, unconstitutional as applied to her, is also unconstitutional in most cases to which it applies.
The Court in Casey sought to craft a compromise on the controversial constitutional issue of state restrictions on access to abortion.
The impulse to seek compromise is common, understandable, and,
indeed, admirable. 2 Nonetheless, where the parties to the litigation
demonstrate that the law is unconstitutional as applied to them, it is
difficult to understand why they should be denied relief. It is disturbing that courts would uphold a law denying the constitutionally
protected liberty of parties to the litigation simply because the law
could validly be applied in a significant number of cases.
The trial court in Compassion in Dying adopted this numerical approach in holding that the Washington ban on assisted suicide was
unconstitutional on its face.2 2 2 It is not clear that this conclusion was
correct. As Part I argues, the court's substantive conclusion that the
ban on physician-assisted death is unconstitutional as applied to Dr.
Roe, and others served by Compassion in Dying, seems correct. The
ban on assisted suicide, however, also protects many other people in
different situations. For example, it protects those who are not terminally ill, or who seek death because of untreated pain or depression.
It is not clear that the ban on assisted suicide is unconstitutional "in a
large fraction of the cases" to which it applies. Certainly, there is no
evidence in the court's decision to support this conclusion.
More important, if Dr. Roe's constitutional rights were infringed
upon by Washington's ban on assisted suicide, whether or not the law
is constitutional in most of its applications should be irrelevant.
C.

Limit Remedies to Named Parties

Another narrow remedy for constitutional violation holds that a
challenged state policy is unconstitutional as applied to the facts of a
particular case. This approach respects state discretion and, at the
same time, protects the individual liberty of the litigating party. The
Court followed this approach in Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,
221. Sylvia A. Law, Abortion Compromise: Inevitable and Impossible, 1992 U. ILL. L. REv.921
(expressing doubt about the possibility and desirability of a compromise on the abortion
issue).
222. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1463 (W.D. Wash. 1994),
rev'd, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir.), reh'g granted en bane, 62 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd, No. 9435534, 1996 WL 94848 (9th Cir. Mar. 6,1996) (en banc); see also supra notes 45, 178 (discussing the Ninth Circuit's en banc decision).
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Inc.,2 ' in finding that a zoning ordinance that excluded a "hospital
for the feebleminded" was irrational as applied to the particular group
home for the mentally retarded that challenged the ordinance. 2 4
Often, however, a holding that a policy is invalid as applied to
particular individuals is inadequate to protect constitutional rights.
The dissenters in Cleburne argued powerfully that it is wrong to "leave
standing a legislative Act resting on 'irrational prejudice' ... , thereby
forcing individuals in the group discriminated against to continue to
run the Act's gauntlet." 22 5 The preceding discussion of justiciability
argues that individually applied remedies are not adequate to protect
constitutional rights in relation to state bans on abortion, refusal of
necessary medical treatment, or physician-assisted suicide.2 26
This is not to say that individually applied remedies are never appropriate. For example, a zoning ordinance that requires permission
for all group living arrangements is not unconstitutional on its face,
simply because it could be applied unconstitutionally to deny a permit
to a group home for the mentally retarded, in a neighborhood where
fraternity houses are allowed. Similarly, Michael Doff discusses a hypothetical mandatory Second Opinion Act, requiring the concurrence

223. 473 U.S. 432 (1984).
224. Id. at 450. The Court explained:
We inquire first whether requiring a special use permit for the Featherston home
in the circumstances here deprives respondents of the equal protection of the
laws. If it does, there will be no occasion to decide whether the special use permit
provision is facially invalid where the mentally retarded are involved, or to put it
another way, whether the city may never insist on a special use permit for a home
for the mentally retarded in an R-3 zone. This is the preferred course of adjudication since it enables courts to avoid making unnecessarily broad constitutional
judgments.
Id. at 447.
225. Id. at 474 (Marshall,J., dissenting); see also Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 233
(1985) (holding a provision disenfranchising various felons unconstitutional on its face
because it was motivated, in part, by a desire to disenfranchise African-Americans; the legislature remained free to disenfranchise some felons through a statute motivated by some
purpose other than racial discrimination); see Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 56
(1974) (rejecting the view that the constitutional violation could be remedied by extending the franchise to the named plaintiffs or to the class of African-American felons).
In many cases the Court has held rules facially unconstitutional because they are unconstitutional as applied to the named plaintiff, even though they might be valid as applied to
others whom they affect. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979) (declaring as unconstitutional a law that denied unwed fathers the right to refuse consent to
adoption, even though many, perhaps most, unwed fathers might legally be denied the
right to protest adoption); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 647-48 (1974)
(holding that a law requiring pregnant teachers to quit their jobs was unconstitutional,
even though there might be legitimate reasons to require some to leave).
226. See supra notes 126-160 and accompanying text.

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 55:292

of two doctors for all major nonemergency surgery.22 7 I agree with his
conclusion that such a law would be constitutional on its face, and
unconstitutional as applied to women seeking abortions. A general
murder statute is not unconstitutional on its face because it is unconstitutional as applied to a person like Dr. Roe's physician who assists
her in dying.
In sum, Part III of this Article has sought to demonstrate that the
Salerno rule-that a law can never be held unconstitutional unless it is
unconstitutional in every conceivable application-is wrong. Second,
it has sought to show that where named plaintiffs demonstrate that a
law is unconstitutional as applied to them, it is wrong to deny them
relief simply because it would be constitutional as applied in some or
even many cases. Third, while individually applied remedies are
sometimes appropriate for an unconstitutional law, sometimes such
remedies are inadequate. The final two sections address the legitimate choices confronting a court that concludes that a law is unconstitutional as applied to the party before it, but constitutional in some of
its applications, and where individually applied remedies are not effective to protect constitutional liberty.
D. Strike the UnconstitutionalLaw and Let the Legislature Try Again
The broadest remedy for a state policy that is unconstitutional as
applied to some individuals is to hold the policy unconstitutional on
its face. The trial court in Compassion in Dying used this remedy in
holding that the prohibition on assisted suicide was unconstitutional
on its face.22 8
At the most obvious level, a judicial determination that a law is
unconstitutional on its face represents a substantial infringement on
governmental discretion and democratic choice. From a more searching perspective, a holding that a government policy is facially uncon227. Dorf, supra note 161, at 275-76.
228. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1467 (W.D. Wash. 1994),
rev'd, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir.), reh'g granted en banc, 62 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd, No. 9435534, 1996 WL 94848 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 1996) (en banc).
The court declares RCW 9A.36.060 unconstitutional because it places an undue
burden on the exercise of a protected Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest...
[and] because it violates the right to equal protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment by prohibiting physician-assisted suicide while permitting the refusal
or withdrawal of life support systems for terminally ill individuals.
Id. On rehearing en banc, the Ninth Circuit declined to hold the statute facially invalid,
but rather held the statute unconstitutional "as applied to the prescription of life-ending
medication for use by terminally ill, competent adult patients who wish to hasten their
deaths." No. 94-35534, 1996 WL 94848, at *5; see also supra note 178 (discussing the Ninth
Circuit's en banc holding).
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stitutional can be viewed as respecting democratic choice by inviting
lawmakers to reformulate their policy in narrower terms, free from
judicial predetermination of the constitutionality of alternative
approaches.
The Washington legislature could respond to the invalidation of
its blanket ban on assisted suicide by adopting a new, more carefully
tailored and limited statute. The new statute would then be subject to
further judicial review. Washington has not done so, and indeed it
appears that there has been little public debate on these issues in that
state since the federal court's decision. Perhaps the lack of public or
legislative response reflects the fact that the case was appealed.22 9
Lawmakers may have hoped that the appellate courts would save them
from the need to address a politically controversial issue.
E. Explain Why the Law Is Unconstitutionaland Enjoin Unconstitutional
Applications
While striking a law as unconstitutional on its face is sometimes
appropriate, in many cases it is not. To take a dramatic example, if
the only Washington law that interfered with Dr. Roe's ability to seek
her physician's help in dying was the criminal prohibition against
murder, it would plainly be inappropriate to redress her constitutional claim by invalidating that statute. 2 However, to say that facial
invalidity is an inappropriate remedy when most of the applications of
the law are constitutionally permissible is not the same as saying, as
the Casey Court did, that the plaintiff, to whom the law may not constitutionally be applied, has no remedy unless she can demonstrate that
the law is unconstitutional in most of its applications.28 1
Finally, when a court determines that a law is unconstitutional as
applied to some, but not all, of the situations that it governs, it can
attempt to explain what is and what is not constitutional. For example, rather than issue a broad holding striking the ban as facially invalid, or a narrow holding finding it unconstitutional only as applied to
the named plaintiffs, the Compassion in Dying court could have declared it unconstitutional to prosecute people who provide assisted
dying in the circumstances specified in the Compassion in Dying
guidelines.
229. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 586 (9th Cir.), reh'ggranted en banc, 62 F.3d 299 (9th
Cir. 1995), rev'd, No. 94-35534, 1996 WL 94848 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 1996) (en banc).
230. I am indebted to Professor Lewis Kornhouser for this obvious, but important,
observation.
231. See supra notes 214-219 and accompanying text.
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The difficulty with this approach is that it places the court in a
highly legislative role. Nonetheless, it is an approach that the
Supreme Court has often taken. For example, a major criticism of Roe
v. Wade2 32 rests on the observation that the Court provided state legis-

latures with too much guidance about what sorts of restrictions on
access to abortion would be constitutionally permissible and what
sorts would not.233 While these problems are serious, this remedial

alternative is often preferable to the other approaches available.
Consider, for example, the classic case, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.2 34 Having reached the substantive conclusion that a damage
23 5
judgment against the New York Times violated the First Amendment,
the Court could simply have held that application of the libel law was
unconstitutional on the particular facts of the case. 23 6 Alternatively,
the Court could have held that the entire common law of libel was
unconstitutional on its face and invited legislatures to formulate liability rules that both respected First Amendment values and provided
protection from defamation.2 3 7 The Court rejected both of these approaches and, rather, sought to explain, in some detail, the circumstances in which libel actions against public officials were
constitutionally permissible.2 38
Similarly, in Bellotti v. Baird,23 9 the Court considered a state law
requiring that parents consent to their daughter's abortion. 240 The
232. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
233. Archibald Cox, for example, wrote:
My criticism of Roe v. Wade is that the Court failed to establish the legitimacy of
the decision by not articulating a precept of sufficient abstractness to lift the ruling above the level of a political judgment based upon the evidence currently
available from the medical, physical, and social sciences. [The opinion is] like a
set of hospital rules and regulations, whose validity [will] be destroyed with new
statistics upon the medical risks of childbirth and abortion or new advances in
providing for the separate existence of a foetus. Neither historian, layman, nor
lawyer will be persuaded that all the details prescribed in Roe [are] part [of] the
Constitution.
ARCHIBALD

Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT

113-14

(1974).
234. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
235. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment reads in pertinent part: "Congress
shall make no law.. . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.. . ." Id.
236. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 283-92. Such a holding would be analogous to the approach
adopted by the Court in Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1984), see
supra note 224.

237. That approach would be comparable to the one adopted by the Court in Thornhill
v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), see supra note 204.
238. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 283-92.
239. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
240. Id. at 625-26 (citing MAss. GEN. LAws ANN., ch. 112, §§ 12Q, 12T, 12U (West Supp.

1979)).
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Court found the law unconstitutional and could have just said so. 2 41
Instead, the Court offered a rather detailed statement of the conditions under which a state might constitutionally involve parents in a
young woman's decision to have an abortion.2 4 2 So, too, in Regents of
the University of Calfornia v. Bakke,24 the Court could have ended its
opinion with its conclusion that the defendants' policy was unconstitutional. 2 Rather, Justice Powell offered a detailed explanation of his
understanding of constitutionally acceptable affirmative action
programs.2 45
Justice Harlan, concurring in Welsh v. United States,2" provided a
wise discussion of these issues.24 7 Welsh was a conscientious objector,
whose objections to war did not rest on religious grounds. 24 8 The
Universal Military Training and Service Act provided exemption from
mandatory military service for any person
who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form. Religious training and belief in this connection means an
individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving
duties superior to those arising from any human relation,
but does not include essentially political, sociological, or
philosophical views or a merely personal moral code.2 4 9
The majority of the Court read the statute to exempt from military service "all those whose consciences, spurred by deeply held
moral, ethical, or religious beliefs, would give them no rest or peace25if
0
they allowed themselves to become a part of an instrument of war."
Justice Harlan did not believe that the congressional words could bear
the meaning that the Court attributed to them and hence confronted
the constitutional claim.25 1 He concluded that limiting the draft exemption "to those opposed to war in general because of theistic be241. Id. at 651.
242. Id. at 643-44.
243. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
244. Id. at 320.
245. Id. at 291-300.
246. 398 U.S. 333, 344 (1970) (Harlan,J., concurring).
247. I am indebted to Professor Larry Kramer for pointing me to this discussion.
248. 398 U.S. at 341.
249. Id. at 336 (quoting the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948, § 6(j),
62 Stat. 612, 50 U.S.C. App. § 456 0 ) (repealed 1973)).
250. 398 U.S. at 344; see also United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 173-80 (1965) (holding that the test of religious belief under the Universal Military Training and Service Act is
whether it is a sincere and meaningful belief parallel to belief in God).
251. 398 U.S. at 345 (Harlan,J., concurring).
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2
liefs runs afoul of the religious clauses of the First Amendment," 25
and particularly the requirement that the government must be neutral between religious and nonreligious beliefs.2 53
Having concluded that the statute was unconstitutional as applied
to some, including Welsh, but not all of those affected by it, Justice
Harlan then confronted the remedial question. 2 14 "[T] here exist two
remedial alternatives: a court may either declare [the exemption] a
nullity and order that its benefits not extend to the class that the legislature intended to benefit, or it may extend the coverage of the statute
to include those who are aggrieved by exclusion."25 5
His conclusion that the exemption should be extended to Welsh
was based largely on practical considerations, including the "intensity
of commitment" to the policy reflected in the exemption and "the
degree of potential disruption of the statutory scheme. 256 And, having decided that the exemption should be extended to protect Welsh,
he adopted, as a constitutional norm, a standard identical to that fash2 57
ioned by the majority as a matter of statutory construction.
The decisions in Welsh v. United States, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, Roe v. Wade, Bellotti v. Baird, and Regents of the University of California v. Bakke are all legislative. Reasonable people have challenged the
particular rules articulated in each case. At the same time, no one
argues that the Court should have simply declared any of these laws
unconstitutional without saying more. Despite our formal and real
respect for democratic process and majority rule, we appreciate guidance, and recognize that courts have broad discretion in the remedial phase of constitutional litigation.
An alternative approach to these remedial issues is to allow the
plaintiffs to specify the scope of the remedy in their definition of the
class affected. 258 As a functional matter, this empowers plaintiffs to
write the law. On the one hand, this might be seen as giving plaintiffs

252. Id.
253. Id. at 356-57.
254. Id. at 361.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 365. Justice Harlan also relied on Justice Brandeis's decision in Iowa-Des
Moines Nat'l Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239, 247 (1931), in which the Court held that the
state denied petitioner the equal protection of the law by taxing him more heavily than his
competitors. Wesh, 398 U.S. at 361-62 & n.15. Equality could be achieved either by decreasing the petitioner's taxes or increasing the taxes of his competitors. Bennett, 284 U.S.
at 247. Based on the impracticality of collecting increased taxes from competitors, the
Court held that petitioner was entitled to recover the overpayment. Id.
257. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 366-67.
258. This alternative was not explicitly considered in Compassion in Dying because the
plaintiff never sought class certification. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d
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undue power to define the scope of constitutional right, and to enlist
courts in overriding legislative judgment. On the other hand, plaintiffs will have powerful incentives to define the affected class narrowly
so as to enhance the power of their substantive claims. Plaintiffs who
define a class broadly to include individuals with weak claims run the
risk that all relief will be denied. People left unprotected by plaintiffs'
narrow and cautious definition of class and remedy always remain free
to assert broader claims in subsequent cases.25 9
In sum, where a court finds that a law violates the constitutional
rights of the parties before it, but may be applied legitimately to
others, it has three legitimate remedial choices. First, it may issue an
order protecting the named parties and the class they represent. Second, it may hold the statute unconstitutional on its face. Third, it may
describe the constitutionally permissible circumstances in which the
objectives of the law may be pursued. If a challenged law violates the
constitutional rights of the parties before it, courts should not deny
relief on the grounds that it is possible to conceive of constitutional
applications of the law, or even if most applications of the law are
constitutional. The question of whether or not most applications of
the challenged law are constitutional is relevant only to inform a
court's choice of whether to provide an individually applied or a facial
remedy. A broad range of factors can legitimately influence whether a
court should simply strike a law as unconstitutional on its face, or seek
to explain the limits of constitutional authority. Once a constitutional
violation has been demonstrated, therefore, courts have broad authority to fashion appropriate remedies.2 6 °
CONCLUSION

Dr. Roe and other people in circumstances described by the
Compassion in Dying guidelines have a powerful liberty and privacy
interest in seeking physician assistance in hastening death. The justifications for state interference with individual autonomy are weak.
586 (9th Cir.), reh'g granted en banc, 62 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd, No. 94-35534, 1996
WL 94848 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 1996) (en banc).
259. For example, Compassion in Dying's guidelines deny assisted suicide to patients
whose friends and family members object. See supra note 5. A class certification that incorporated the Compassion in Dying guidelines would not protect an individual who sought
physician help to hasten dying over the objection of friends and family. See supra note 5.
Such an individual, or class of individuals could challenge that exclusion.
260. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1971) (holding
that in the absence of dejure segregation, a school board is not required to change the
racial composition of the student body).
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However, there are other situations in which state interests in prohibiting assisted suicide are much stronger.
In these circumstances, courts should not refuse to vindicate Dr.
Roe's constitutional liberty simply because the law might validly be
applied to others. At a minimum, courts should provide prompt relief
to named parties whose rights are violated. In addition, in these circumstances courts should provide more general relief in one of two
ways. The law that is unconstitutional as applied to some, but not all,
of those it affects, may be struck down as unconstitutional on its face,
inviting legislative revision. Alternatively, the court, with the assistance of the parties before it, may define the circumstances in which it
would be unconstitutional to apply the law and forbid application in
such cases. The choice between these alternatives is a matter of sound
judicial discretion, informed by respect for democratic processes and
vigilance in protecting individual constitutional liberty.

